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THE CONCEPT OF LAW AND THE NEW 
PUBLIC LAW SCHOLARSHIP 
Edward L. Rubin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article is an attempt to identify the nature of an emerging field 
oflegal scholarship known as "New Public Law." "New," of course, 
is a dangerous term. Our society's image of itself as forward looking 
and its tendency to market itself to itself through claims of novelty has 
spawned a range of phrases from the New Deal to the New Criticism 
to various new, improved laundry detergents. One does not hear very 
many positive comments about the "old" these days. The argument 
that old ways of doing things are better has become an emblem of 
mistaken thought, and the elderly have been demoted from a source of 
experience and wisdom to just one more underrepresented group. As 
a result, it is very easy to make grandiose and ultimately unjustified 
claims for minor changes by slapping the word "new" on them. 
But there is something truly new about New Public Law; some-
thing which promises to revitalize legal scholarship by enabling it to 
deal with the central features of our present-day legal system. Most 
legal scholarship, of course, is about the present; the problem is it 
tends to be restricted to an increasingly secondary legal institution, 
namely, the judiciary. Our legal system is dominated by legislatures 
and administrative agencies and consists primarily of the huge volume 
of statutes and regulations they produce. It is difficult to gaze on this 
vast, recent, rapidly developing, disorganized sprawl. One is tempted 
to be a legal tourist, wandering among the historic, well-documented 
edifices at the center and ignoring the formless suburbs that comprise 
the major portion of the new metropolis. This is the choice that legal 
scholarship has made thus far. 
There is nothing wrong or insignificant about this scholarship, and 
we should not abandon it. Judicial decisionmaking remains an impor-
tant aspect of our legal system, and the current analysis of it is a 
worthwhile enterprise. But it is simply less important than it used to 
be, and the continued concentration of attention on it abandons in-
creasingly large areas of potential inquiry. The New Public Law 
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scholarship represents an effort to expand the boundaries of legal 
scholarship until they are once again coterminous with the boundaries 
of law, as they were before the administrative state evolved. 
This enterprise involves much more than a shift in subject matter. 
The conceptual structure of existing legal scholarship is simply un-
suited to an analysis of the administrative state. Legal scholars have 
not restricted their efforts to judicial decisionmaking because of some 
quixotic desire to reject the modem world; on the contrary, they are 
fully cognizant of its character and regularly discuss the way it affects 
their area of study. Their tendency to remain within the confines of 
that area, as established during the past century, springs from an un-
certainty about the way to conceptualize the administrative apparatus. 
Instead legal scholars consign it to other disciplines, such as political 
science or public policy. Statutes, regulations, and administrative ac-
tion are not regarded as "law"; they are law of course, in common 
parlance and in practical effect, but they are not amenable to the con-
ceptual system of existing legal scholarship. 
A new conceptual system cannot be developed out of thin air, how-
ever, or instituted by fiat. If legal scholars are to address the realities 
of the administrative state, they must do so with the skills available to 
them and within their present institutional structures. Change is pos-
sible, but anything more than incremental change in an academic dis-
cipline is unlikely, and recommendations that demand more condemn 
themselves to irrelevance. To put the matter another way, a New Pub-
lic Law scholarship that deals with our administrative state must con-
tinue to be recognizable as law to existing legal scholars. Such an 
adaptation of legal analysis may not be possible, but it is certainly 
worth trying. 
The emerging New Public Law scholarship represents such an at-
tempt. This article discusses the changes in the law that have moti-
vated it, the conceptual structure that it has developed in response to 
those changes, and the way in which that conceptual structure, despite 
its novelty, remains recognizable as legal scholarship. 
II. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND SOCIETY'S CONCEPT OF LAW 
Calls for a new mode of legal scholarship or legal education based 
on the realities of our modem state are far from new, of course. In-
deed, they began at the same time that law schools themselves began 1 
1. See, e.g., W. CHAsE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RlsE OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 46-59 (1982); see generally R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN 
AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s 39·84 (1983). 
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and have continued unabated to the present day. A crescendo of sorts 
was reached during the legal realist movement, with the work of Har-
old Laswell and Myers McDougal being particularly notable in its de-
mand for policy analysis and empirical observation.2 Given the 
regularity with which this demand has been sounded, it seems surpris-
ing that it remains so unrequited and that any effort to respond to it 
could be described as new. Commentators, apparently at a loss for an 
explanation, tend to attribute the lack of change to the baneful influ-
ence of Harvard Law School. 3 A more convincing explanation, how-
ever, is conceptual; legal scholars have continued to write about law 
the way they do because of their conception of law. Change will not 
come until that conception changes; as long as new approaches are 
defined as law-and-something else, rather than as law, the very charac-
terization necessarily proclaims their marginality. 
But why should legal scholars alter their conception of law? The 
most obvious response is that society's conception of law has changed 
and that legal scholars must keep pace. That claim, however, contains 
an often-overlooked complexity that is responsible for much of the dis-
junction between our legal scholarship and our legal system. Very few 
intellectual disciplines must reconceptualize their methodology be-
cause of an underlying change in their subject matter. For example, 
the past fifty years have seen cataclysmic historical events - World 
War II, the Cold War, the end of colonialism, and so forth. But these 
events generally are not regarded as demanding a change in the meth-
odology of historical studies. Quite the contrary, we would look to 
our established methodology as a way to understand the events that 
have occurred. 
There are two caveats to the observation, but neither comes close 
to the complete negation of it that apparently obtains in legal scholar-
ship. First, events that occur in the underlying subject of study may 
produce a change in methodology by disproving some widely held be-
lief. The classic example is Einstein's Theory of Relativity, which al-
tered so many scientific theories about physical reality.4 But this 
2. Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in Public 
Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 207-17 (1943); McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From 
Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World Community, 56 YALE L.J. 1345 {1947); see also 
Gellhorn, The Law Schools' Responsibility for Training Public Servants, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 
{1942); Keyserling, Social Objectives in Legal Education, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 437 (1933). 
3. See W. CHAsE, supra note l, at 23-83; R. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 51-64; Schlegel, 
Langdell's Legacy or, The Case of the Empty Envelope (Book Review), 36 STAN. L. REV. 1517, 
1524-25 (1984). 
4. For Kuhn, Einstein's theory is a classic example of a paradigm shift from one basic con-
ception of the world to another. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 97-
101 (1962). Kuhn is not particularly interested, however, in the distinction between the content 
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occurs less often than one might suppose; more typically, the event 
disproves a particular theory within the existing methodology. Ein-
stein's theory, epochal though it was, did not really transform the 
methodology of modem physics. The content changed, but the disci-
pline proceeded in much the same way as it had before. 5 Moreover, 
even this fairly limited effect of methodology is not necessary but con-
tingent; it depends on whether the event in question disproves rather 
than confirms existing methodological approaches. The development 
of the Watson-Crick DNA model, for example, was as significant for 
molecular biology as Einstein's theory was for theoretical physics. But 
it had no methodological implications at all; Watson and Crick 
achieved it using the existing methodology, and it only confirmed that 
methodology's effectiveness. 6 
The second caveat is that methodologies do change, and these 
changes are often linked to broader patterns. But the patterns tend to 
be intellectual ones, related to our general conception of methodology, 
rather than events in the underlying subject matter. The methodology 
of history has changed from a narrative of public events to an analysis 
of socioeconomic relationships, and this change can be traced to a spe-
cific period of time. But the events that produced this change were 
intellectual, not historic; they can be attributed to Adam Smith or Au-
guste Compte much more directly than to Napoleon or Wellington. 
Moreover, once the change has occurred, the new methodology is 
equally applicable to events before the change. The historical writing 
of classical authors exemplifies the premodem narrative style, but it 
would be absurd for modem historians to view socioeconomic meth-
ods as inapplicable to Greek or Roman history. 
Thus, the idea that alterations in society's conception of law re-
quire a new legal theory must depend upon some feature of legal the-
ory that distinguishes it from other academic disciplines. This 
distinguishing feature is most readily identified as the prescriptive 
and the methodology of science, an issue on which he has been criticized. See Lakatos, Falsifica-
tion and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes in CRrnCISM AND THE GROWTH 
OF KNOWLEDGE 91, 178 (I'. Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds. 1970). It is unclear how a change in 
world-view correlates with a change in method. Perhaps the most notable methodological 
change that Einstein's overthrow of Newtonian mechanics produced was the stochastic model of 
physical phenomena, a model which made Einstein himself distinctly uncomfortable. See N. 
BOHR, Discussion with Einstein of Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics, in ATOMIC PHYS-
ICS AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 32, 56 (1958); W. HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND BEYOND 62-69 
(1971). 
5. With the exception of the change described in note 4, supra, the mode of generating and 
verifying empirical data did not really change, even in response to a change as large as Einstein's 
revision. 
6. For an account of this event, see J. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX (1968). 
796 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:792 
quality of legal scholarship. 7 While the declared purpose of most nat-
ural and social sciences is to discover observed events, and the purpose 
of most humanistic studies is to interpret artistic productions, the de-
clared purpose of legal scholarship is to frame recommendations to 
responsible decisionmakers. This does not mean that the only crite-
rion for judging legal scholarship is whether its recommendations are 
adopted. Like other fields, law constitutes a self-sustaining discipline, 
whose participants are capable of evaluating their own efforts. What it 
means is that the concept of recommendation, or prescription, struc-
tures the entire discipline, and that evaluation will be based on 
whether or not the work provides a reasonable or imaginative 
recommendation. 
Because prescription is the structuring purpose of legal scholar-
ship, that scholarship must develop a mode of discourse appropriate to 
its prescriptive enterprise. It must, in other words, speak explicitly to 
the decisionmakers who constitute the audience for its prescriptions. 
It must address the issues that these decisionmakers confront, speak in 
terms that are meaningful to them, and frame proposals that they can 
conceivably implement. Again, these principles only structure the 
discourse and are not necessarily literal requirements. Although it 
may be gratifying for a legal scholar to have her recommendations 
adopted, the quality of her work will not be judged by its adoption, but 
by its logic, creativity, and judgment, when viewed as a set of 
recommendations. 
Because of the prescriptive quality of legal scholarship, changes in 
the way our society conceives and uses law demand changes in the 
scholarship's methodology. Not all changes are equally profound, of 
course. Just as new discoveries in natural sciences can transform the 
content of an entire field without altering its methodology, some 
changes in the legal system do not require any corresponding changes 
in legal scholarship. In 1937, for example, the Supreme Court 
changed its entire theory of the Constitution. 8 That shift provided a 
7. The discussion is based on Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 1835 (1988). 
8. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding state regulation of 
women's wages, and overruling substantive due process decision in Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 
261 U.S. 525 (1923)); United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding state 
regulation of filled milk and rejecting substantive due process rationale); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 
U.S. 236 (1941) (upholding state law fixing maximum fee, and explicitly denying precedentinl 
value of prior substantive due process decision in Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928)). For 
the view that these decisions represented a transformation of the Constitution, equivalent in ef-
fect to the Civil War Amendments, see Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Conventional Law, 99 
YALE L.J. 453, 486-515 (1989); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 
YALE L.J. 1013, 1044-72 (1984). 
February 1991] The Concept of Law 797 
topic of debate among constitutional scholars for several decades, but 
it did not require a different approach to scholarship; the Court's new 
theory could be subjected to the same techniques of case analysis as 
the old one. 
The changes that have occurred in our social conception of law 
over the course of the past century are of a different order. They have 
changed the meaning of law in its entirety because they have created a 
new group of legal decisionmakers. These decisionmakers, primarily 
legislators and administrators, are now the principal law-creating offi-
cials in our society, and thus the most appropriate audience for legal 
scholars. To the extent that legal scholars fail to structure their works 
as recommendations to these decisionmakers, they will restrict the sig-
nificance of their endeavors. 
Legal scholars, however, need not change. They can opt for the 
limited significance that results from continuing to underemphasize 
legislative and administrative lawmaking. Because scholarly success is 
determined within the academy, and not by the decisionmakers whose 
lawmaking function is ignored, the system can perpetuate itself. This 
is particularly true because legal scholars, as faculty members, control 
entry into a lucrative profession. If those who rejected Einstein's the-
ory, and insisted on the truth of Newtonian mechanics, controlled en-
try into civil engineering, they too might still grace our campuses some . 
ninety years after their ideas ran into conceptual difficulties. 9 
Thus, although the transformation of our legal system ought to 
produce changes in a prescriptive discipline such as legal scholarship, 
that transformation will not compel the change. The legal academy 
has enough autonomy to retain its premodern attitudes. Change re-
quires a new conception of law; scholars must not only think differ-
ently about what counts as law, but they must think differently about 
the essence of law itself. To explore the parameters of the process 
more fully, it is necessary to consider the old and new conceptions of 
law in greater detail. 
III. THE OLD CONCEPT OF LAW 
A century ago, when law schools first appeared as graduate pro-
grams in American universities10 and legal scholarship took shape as 
9. Civil engineering could be performed perfectly well on the basis of Newtonian mechanics, 
since relativistic effects do not appear at the velocities and energy levels involved. Our hypotheti-
cal Newtonians could not analyze the behavior of elementary particles, of course, but they might 
respond that the study of these particles was not physics, but quantumology, and consign it to a 
separate department of the university. 
10. During the 1820s, and again in the 1850s and 1860s, a number of American colleges 
established affiliations with private law schools. See R. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 5-28. These 
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an academic discipline, law was conceived as the special province of 
the judiciary. The judiciary both declared the law and applied it to 
particular cases. Law meant the common law, the body of rules which 
defined crimes and governed interactions between private citizens. 11 
Sophisticated observers recognized, of course, that the legislature 
could make law and that the Constitution served as the organic law of 
the nation. The general view, however, was that both ordinary legisla-
tion and the Constitution belonged to the realm of politics, and were 
somehow distinct from the process by which courts declared and ap-
plied the law.12 These distinctions may seem artificial and incoherent 
today, but they were entirely meaningful to the attorneys and judges 
who comprised the legal community a century ago. 
The common law that judges declared and implemented possessed 
a number of distinguishing features that sprang from the judiciary's 
institutional position and conceptual orientation. Much of this is fa-
miliar but, as Melvin Eisenberg's recent study suggests, it is too subtle 
and complex for easy generalizations.13 For present purposes, how-
ever, a few features that distinguish the judge-made law of the previ-
ous century can be identified. 
To begin with, traditional common law was regarded as embody-
ing a set of transcendental principles, that is, principles that were not 
simply the enacted rules of a particular regime but general legal princi-
ples that applied to all societies.14 Fault, intent, consent, causation, 
property, responsibility, and various other concepts were seen as uni-
versal elements of any developed legal system. This belief has an un-
deniable intellectual appeal, but it also rested on a strong institutional 
basis. As a result of our revolution we rejected the King of England, 
the statutes of England, the taxes of England, even the judges of Eng-
land, but we did not reject the judge-made law of England. 15 The only 
law schools were pure trade schools - somewhat similar, one gathers, to the present·day truck 
driving schools that advertise on late-night television. The development of law school as a three· 
year graduate program was the work of Charles Eliot, as President of Harvard, and Christopher 
Langdell, as Dean of the Law School. See id. at 36-37; see also Chase, The Birth of the Modern 
Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HISr. 329 (1979). The new structure required the study of law to 
become an academic discipline as well as training for a profession. 
11. See G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41·67 (1977); L. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY 
OF AMERICAN LAW 354-56 (1973). 
12. See R. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 39-42. 
13. M. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE CoMMON LAW (1988). 
14. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRACT 35-44 (1974) (discussing Williston); Grey, 
Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 5, 11-15 (1983); White, The Impact of Legal Sci-
ence on Tort Law, 1880-1910, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 213, 220-21 (1978). 
15. See 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 472-73 (2d ed. 1832): 
The common law of England has been assumed, or declared by statute, with the like modifi-
cations, as the law of every state .•.. 
The best evidence of the common law is to be found in the decisions of the courts of 
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basis for this continued fealty to the laws of a deposed sovereign was 
that these laws were not the political acts of a particular regime but 
law itself - general or transcendental principles that were valid in all 
societies. 
As our democracy evolved, the idea of a transcendental law was 
infused with the newer one that judges, unlike the legislature or the 
chief executive, were appointed officials who could exercise lawmaking 
power only when they were discovering general principles, rather than 
expressing their own policy preferences. Alexander Bickel christened 
this same concern "the counter-majoritarian difficulty" in the case 
where a court overturns an enacted statute on constitutional 
grounds.16 The justification for such actions generally turns on some 
appeal to the Constitution itself, but common law judges, who were 
equally unelected, had no positive law on which they could rely; the 
legitimacy of their lawmaking role in a democratic government had to 
derive from the inherent validity of the laws that they declared -
from its relationship to general principles. 
Second, judge-made law must develop incrementally. Because of 
the institutional structure of the judiciary, judges cannot initiate law-
making opportunities. They do have the power to select among the 
opportunities presented, even at the trial level, but they are limited to 
the range of cases presented to them. Moreover, this phenomenologi-
cal position as a decisionmaker is contextualized within the case. To 
borrow Gadamer's image, the facts presented by the case create the 
horizon of judges' legitimate decisionmaking power.17 While judicial 
notice, the Brandeis brief, and the more sociological style of contem-
porary legal reasoning allows some lateral expansion of this horizon, 
judges still have no independent fact gathering or general lawmaking 
powers. They are on the safest and most legitimate ground when they 
justice, contained in numerous volumes of reports, and in the treaties and digests of learned 
men, which have been multiplying from the earliest periods of English history down to the 
present time. 
Kent also allows "English statutes passed before the emigration of our ancestors" to be part of 
the common law of the United States. Id. at 473. Presumably, this is because these statutes serve 
as a basis for judicial decisions. Clearly, contemporary English statutes would not be treated one 
same way. 
16. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962). Not all of Bickel's 
concerns apply to judicial lawmaking. For example, Bickel believed that the judiciary's power to 
declare enacted laws unconstitutional might weaken the democratic process because legislators 
would rely on the courts to correct their mistakes. Id. at 21-22. This is not a significant problem 
in common law, because legislation clearly supersedes it. But Bickel's basic concern about law-
making by officials who are not subject to public scrutiny and control is fully applicable. 
17. H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 269-74 (G. Barden & J. Cumming trans. 2d ed. 
1975). See id. at 269 ("Every finite present has its limitations. We define the concept of 'situa-
tion' by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence an 
essential part of the concept of situation is the concept of 'horizon.' "). 
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restrict themselves to the range of situations that the case presents. 
This necessitates an incremental decisionmaking style, one that pro-
ceeds by fact-specific stages rather than by broad generalizations.18 
When courts, even constitutional courts, veer too far from this ideal, 
their decisions become suspect. The Roe v. Wade opinion, 19 with its 
judicial statute about trimesters, is a familiar example. While the chal-
lenge to this case is largely a political and moral one, its legitimacy 
certainly was impaired by the universal agreement that the Supreme 
Court wrote a poor opinion. 20 
The combination of transcendental principles with incremental 
decisionmaking tends to generate another characteristic of the judge-
made law: its reliance upon analogy. Eisenberg indicates that analogy 
is not an independent technique but a mode of reasoning that must be 
guided by overarching rules or principles.21 The converse is true as 
well; in traditional common law analysis, principles were typically 
brought to bear upon the case at hand through the medium of analogy. 
The reason is that these principles are found in the specific, situation-
contained cases that form the arena of judicial reasoning. If cases 
serve as the only arena for the actuation of these principles, then they 
are the primary and most important source of law. To discard the use 
of analogy, one would need unmediated access to the principles them-
selves. This is possible when the transcendental principles have some 
independent source; the claim of divine revelation, for example, rejects 
established bodies of doctrine in favor of direct communication with 
the Almighty. Closer to home, constitutional courts sometimes reject 
a line of precedent by going back to the original words of the Constitu-
tion. 22 In the common law, however, no recognized authority estab-
lishes the guiding principles. These principles are most authoritatively 
established through their appearance in decided cases, much as artistic 
genius is actuated exclusively through specific works of art.23 This 
18. See E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REAsONING 16-17 (1948). 
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
20. Negative assessments of the Court's opinion are legion. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of 
Crying Wolf, A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due 
Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP. Cr. REV. 159; Henkin, Privacy and 
Autonomy, 74 CoLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 998-99 (1979); Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. 
REV. 1569 (1979). 
21. M. EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 83-96. 
22. A notorious example is Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972), where the 
Court suddenly found that the word "property" in the due process clause had significance for the 
doctrine that had not been previously recognized. 
23. I. KANT, CRmQUE OF JUDGMENT 46-50 (J. Bernard trans. 1951). 
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compels judges to take prior cases very seriously and leads naturally to 
an analogical approach. 
Finally, the common law is characterized by a mode of argument 
which can be referred to as process justification. The decisionmaker 
justifies her decision by setting forth the steps she used to reach it. In 
a typical judicial opinion, the judge begins by characterizing the facts 
of the case at hand and then compares this characterization with the 
conclusions of prior cases. By pointing out similarities and differences 
between these prior cases, guided by the principles that transcend each 
case but find expression in it, the judge will then reach a conclusion 
about the proper way to decide the case at hand. If this conclusion is 
subject to significant challenges, from one of the parties or otherwise, 
the judge will typically consider each challenge in order and explain 
why it is not persuasive. This process argument is not psychological 
but conceptual. The judge is not trying to recreate her actual thought 
patterns, but to justify her conclusion by showing that it proceeds 
from accepted sources by legitimate, properly argued steps. 
While process reasoning is obviously compatible with an incremen-
tal, analogical approach, it is not necessarily limited to that approach. 
Mathematical proofs also employ process reasoning, although they 
generally do not rely upon analogy or incrementalism. The necessary 
link seems to be between process reasoning and transcendental princi-
ples. If one begins with general principles, then truth is to be found by 
reasoning from those principles deductively. There is no independent 
criterion for testing the validity of the endpoint; one must trace the 
path back to the principles with which one began. The process be-
comes more complicated, at least in theory, if one does not possess 
unmediated access to those principles, and must discern their contours 
from their contextualized expressions. This precludes pure deduction, 
as in mathematics, and compels reliance on techniques such as 
analogy. 
The common law, of course, has not remained unaltered since the 
age of formalism. In fact, its distinctive features, as identified above, 
have been significantly modified by the political and conceptual events 
of this century.24 Most notably, common law decisionmaking no 
longer makes a strong claim to transcendental principles, although 
residual traces of this claim can still be found in judicial language. 25 
24. See Farber & Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of 
the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875 (1990); Strauss, Review Essay: Sunstein, Statutes and 
the Common Law - Reconciling Markets, the Communal Impulse, and the Mammoth State, 89 
MICH. L. REv. 907 (1990). 
25. Legal realism and critical legal studies have expended much of their energy in establish-
ing the political, rather than transcendental, nature of legal principles. See, e.g., R. UNGER, 
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The more frequent claim is that the principles which animate judicial 
decisionmaking are transpolitical; although they may not be univer-
sally true, they are true for our culture because they reflect a consen-
sus that crosses existing political boundaries. This is sufficient to 
establish the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking in the face of Bickel's 
countermajoritarian concern. It does not explain why the common 
law of another nation, such as England, would have authoritative 
force, but by the twentieth century, America's common law was suffi-
ciently indigenous to render such an explanation unnecessary. 
Along with the reinterpretation of guiding principles of common 
law as transpolitical rather than transcendental came the cautious use 
of other modes of reasoning in judicial decisionmaking. Policy some-
times displaced analogy; instead of looking to prior decisions as au-
thority, judges would look to statutes, executive proclamations, or 
public opinion.26 This policy orientation was linked to the change in 
the perceived provenance of the animating principles. If the principles 
were merely transpolitical, and not transcendental, they could be em-
bodied in sources other than judicial decisions. One might find these 
principles reflected in particular legislative actions or particular ex-
pressions of popular opinion. The problem, of course, was to separate 
the transpolitical from the contingently political, the policy of the pub-
lic at large from the policy of the Democratic or Republican party. 27 
For this reason, public policy had to be invoked with care, and only in 
the context of proper judicial analysis. Nonetheless, it was an avail-
able source of authority, and allowed the common law to reflect broad 
social and political developments. These modifications produce the 
flexibility and continued vitality of common law results. 
IV. THE NEW CONCEPT OF LAW 
The growth of the administrative state and the associated or paral-
lel developments in social attitudes have brought with them a new 
KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs (1975); Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Ap· 
proach, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935). By now, the point has been fully assimilated into our 
legal consciousness. See B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 6-22 (1984). 
26. See M. EISENBERG., supra note 13, at 29-31. 
27. The crucial factor is consensus. One reliable guide to consensus is a statute which, de· 
spite its partisan provenance, becomes the law of the land upon enactment. See Farber & 
Frickey, supra note 24, at 892-93, 898-99. Another guide is social attitudes that seem to the 
judge to be broadly, albeit not universally, held. See M. EISENBERG., supra note 13, at 14-26; 
Greenwalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REV. 991, 1004-05 (1977); Welling· 
ton, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 
YALE L.J. 221, 226-29 (1973). The dangers and inconsistencies of relying on each of these 
sources are obvious, even to judges; the point is merely that judges aspire to transpolitical, rather 
than contingently political, sources for their policy determinations. 
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conception of law, and a concomitant change in judicial attitudes and 
methods. Scholars frequently speak of the judge who ventures beyond 
the bounds of the common law for principles of legal decisionmaking 
and implements his conclusions by extensive, specially designed reme-
dial orders.28 In recent years, the emphasis on the judge's role as an 
interpreter of statutes has grown, again rejecting the boundaries of 
common law to deal with the judge's function in the modem state.29 
All this writing, however, gravely underestimates the changes that 
have occurred because it continues to focus on the judge. The most 
notable change that the administrative state has effected in our legal 
system is that judges are no longer our primary lawmakers. Legisla-
tors and administrators now ~ that role. Consequently, any body of 
writing that focuses on judges is likely to overlook the truly distinctive 
features of law in the modem state. Those features can only be per-
ceived by considering the lawmaking functions of legislators and ad-
ministrators, and investigating what law means to these -
decisionmakers. 
At the outset, one must recognize that the advent of legislators and 
administrators as our primary lawmakers is just one part of the larger 
set of changes produced by the administrative state. Administrators 
have also become our primary adjudicators, 30 and to the extent that 
adjudication continues to make law, that lawmaking process will oc-
cur within the administrative agency as well.31 The Presidency has 
changed character, becoming much more of a coordinating and direc-
28. See, e.g .• D. HOROWITZ, THE CoURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 4-9 (1977); Chayes, The 
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1284 (1976); Fiss, The 
Supreme Court, 1978 Term -Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1979); 
Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 376-78 (1982). 
29. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982); 
Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, 62-66 (1988); Eskridge, Dy-
namic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987); Macey, Promoting Public Re-
garding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation, An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 223, 226-27 (1986); Posner, Statutory Interpretation -In the Classroom, In the Courtroom, 
50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 801-02 (1983); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 
103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 412-13 (1989). 
30. For an extensive discussion of the failure of legal scholarship to deal with administrative 
adjudication, see W. CHASE, supra note 1, at 12-22. Chase's account focuses heavily on historical 
contingencies, particularly the domination of the Harvard Law School method. In his view, 
things might have gone quite differently had Ernst Freund, the hero of his account, prevailed in 
his plans at the University of Chicago, instead of being defeated by Joseph H. Beale and Felix 
Frankfurter, id. at 46-59, 94-135. There is poignance to the story Chase relates, but it seems 
difficult to believe that such large trends turned on the personal influence of a few academics. 
31. For a discussion of the way in which administrative adjudication requires a reinterpreta-
tion of the adjudicative process, see J. 'MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 14-17 (1983); J. 
MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 12-15 (1985); Rubin, Due Process 
and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 1044 (1984); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New 
Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445 
(1977). 
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tion-setting office for the executive agencies and perhaps the independ-
ent agencies as well. 32 Other forms of control, besides formal 
lawmaking, have arisen or expanded in importance. All these develop-
ments are relevant to legal scholarship; for the present however, the 
most important development, because it represents the very essence of 
our new governmental system, is that legislators and administrators 
make the vast bulk of our laws. As a result, the entire concept of law 
has been transformed. The general character of this transformation 
has been explored by Bruce Ackerman,33 and by Philippe Nonet and 
Philip Selznick, 34 among others. For present purposes, the concern is 
with the way that our society's dominant conception of law itself has 
changed since the common law era. 
Legislators and administrators live in a regime of positive law, not 
transcendental or even transpolitical legal principles. For legislators, 
the law is an instrumentality by which they achieve their political or 
ideological goals. For administrators, some law is a set of explicit in-
structions from the legislature, ranging from the incredibly vague to 
the unbelievably detailed, but always proceeding from a definite source 
and having some specific purpose. The remaining law consists of the 
rules the administrators promulgate, and is analogous to legislation; it 
implements specific purposes, theoretically the purposes of the author-
izing statute, but often as political or ideological as the legislature's.35 
Courts intercede in this modem lawmaking process, but less often 
than the casebooks would suggest and almost always in a supervisory 
capacity. They declare that the administrators have violated a gov-
erning statute, or that the legislature has violated the Constitution, but 
they always point to a positive legal enactment of our own nation 
rather than invoking transcendental principles. Legislators and ad-
ministrators, in their day-to-day activities, see law as an instrumental-
ity; a means of achieving specific purposes. 
Secondly, the development of law in our modem legal regime is 
not necessarily incremental. Sometimes it is: statutes are amended, 
agencies redirected by legislative oversight, regulations amended by 
32. See generally E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984, 84-191 
(R. Bland, T. Hindson, J. Peltason eds. 5th ed. 1984); R. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PRESIDENCY (1983); R. NEUSfADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1960); Bruff, Presidential Power 
and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451 (1979). 
33. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 25. 
34. P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSmON (1978). 
35. See generally E. BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A 
BILL BECOMES A LAW (1977); M. DERTHICK, NEW TOWNS IN-TOWN: WHY A FEDERAL PRO· 
GRAM FAILED (1972); I. PRESSMAN & A. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION (2d ed. 1979); B. 
RADIN, IMPLEMENTATION, CHANGE, AND THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY: SCHOOL DESEGRE· 
GATION POLICY IN H.E.W. 1964-68 (1977). 
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the agencies, and interpretations of existing laws and regulations al-
tered by shifts in administrative strategy. But at other times, major 
policy initiatives are undertaken: a new statute, a major change in 
executive policy, even a comprehensive regulation. The degree of 
change is thus the decisionmaker's choice, rather than being fixed by 
the decisionmaking process itself. To continue Gadamer's image, the 
regulatory state adds another dimension to the case-situated position 
of legal decisionmakers. It enables them to rise out of specific situa-
tions to an altitude where comprehensive planning over a wide area of 
legal terrain can occur. As a consequence, detail may be lost, but that 
is a specific problem that the decisionmakers may try to solve when 
operating at that altitude. This additional dimension allows for gen-
eral declarations of law, designed to implement broad, comprehensive 
policies. 
Because of this instrumental and potentially comprehensive ap-
proach, the development of law no longer relies upon analogy. Stated 
most starkly, and with only slight exaggeration, prior legislation has 
no binding effect on current enactments whatsoever. It may serve as a 
source of information; a conscientious, public-oriented legislator will 
look at prior laws to determine whether a particular legislative strat-
egy is effective, while a venal, public-choice legislator will look to these 
laws to see whether a particular strategy got its sponsors clobbered in 
the last election. But neither legislator will regard prior law as a 
source of authority for a new enactment. The policy judgments that 
control their enactments, unlike the principles that control judicial de-
cisions, are not perceived as being expressed through the medium of 
prior enactments. 36 Because these policies are contingent and instru-
mental, rather than transcendental, legislators can have direct access 
to them, and they are not necessarily expressed in prior statutes. 
For administrators, the governing statute is of course an authority, 
but this is the authority of hierarchy and direct command, not the 
analogical authority of parallel decisions. Administrators also decide 
on the basis of policies; these may come from the statute, or from non-
statutory political or ideological considerations. But they have a defi-
nite source, and need not be sought in prior regulations. Modern law 
develops by adding new enactments, and replacing or amending old 
ones, but not by analogy from prior laws. Thus, it has no need of the 
36. In narrative accounts of legislative drafting and design, politics and policy figure promi-
nently, but prior law is hardly ever mentioned. See, e.g., S. BAILEY, CONGRESS MAKES A LAW: 
THE STORY BEHIND THE EMPLOYMENT Acr OF 1946 (1950); S. DAVID, WITH DIGNITY: THE 
SEARCH FOR MEDICINE AND MEDICAID (1985); E. REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION 
(1973). 
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elaborate theory of overruling that Eisenberg has explicated for the 
common law.37 
Finally, modem legisiative and administrative law is distinguished 
from the common law by its mode of justification. Instead of process 
justification, where the decisionmaker traces an idealized path from 
source to conclusion, legislators and administrators use what may be 
described as cause-and-result justification. They take action because a 
problem exists, 38 and their choice of action is based on the expected 
effects. This mode of justification is set forth in the preamble of virtu-
ally every statute. The "Whereas" clause states the problem -
"Whereas the legislature finds that there exists a lack of affordable 
rental housing within its jurisdiction ... " - and the "hereby enacts" 
clause states the expected result - "the legislature hereby enacts a 
general limitation on rents, so that more rental units will be offered at 
affordable rates." It would seem irrelevant, and peculiar, for a statute 
to explain how the legislature figured out the provisions it enacted.39 
This is not simply because of Bismark's observation that anyone who 
loves law or sausage should not watch either being made. The legisla-
ture could readily present a sanitized version of its thought process, if 
that were deemed important. But it is not: statutes are regarded as 
instrumentalities, designed to achieve particular results, and they are 
justified by a perceived need to achieve results in a given area, and by 
the results that they achieve. 
This then is the conception of law that emerged from our modem, 
administrative state. In some sense it simply describes the lawmaking 
functions of legislators and administrators, as opposed to judges, and 
it emphasizes the shift from common to statutory law. But it also 
37. M. EISENBERG, supra note 13. 
38. This is the mode of thought that Max Weber identified as purposive-rational, and that he 
specifically linked to modem bureaucratic institutions. See M. WEBER, EcoNOMY AND SOCIETY 
(G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1978). For an incisive discussion of Weber's approach, see 1 J. 
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 143-271 (T. McCarthy trans. 1981). 
39. The growing criticism of using legislative history as a guide to interpretation is based on 
the perceived irrelevance of any effort to recreate the thought process of the legislature. While 
speeches and committee reports generally attempt to justify the statute's provisions in terms of 
the results to be achieved, they sometimes do advance purported descriptions of the legislative 
thought process. Because these descriptions have no legitimate function, they have come to be 
perceived as conscious efforts to manipulate subsequent interpreters of the statute. See, e.g., 
Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 
S. Ct. 939, 946 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1341-44 (7th Cir. 
1989) (Easterbrook, J.); Stoddard v. Board of Governors, 868 F.2d 1308, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(Buckley, J.) (quoting Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373-74 
(1986)); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, 
J.); Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & Puu. 
POLY. 59 (1988); Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371. 
There has been no similar attack on judges explanations of their decisions as a guide to 
interpretation. 
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represents our society's view of what "law" really is. Thus, legal deci-
sions in other institutions, such as courts, tend to be assimilated into 
the dominant view. In preadministrative America, lawmaking by leg-
islatures was regarded as an appendage to the common law, a way of 
overruling particularly unpopular decisions, asserting or waiving gov-
ernmental rights, or enforcing judicial decrees.40 Of course, legisla-
tures did many other things as well - they appropriated funds, 
imposed taxes, approved treaties, acquired and distributed government 
property, and so forth, but these things were generally not viewed as 
law. Conversely, our modern view of judge-made law is that it con-
sists of the incremental articulation of a general plan in situations 
where such an approach makes sense on policy grounds.41 The com-
mon law authority of courts is established by tradition, but we tend to 
explain it in a similar manner. Moreover, that explanation - that 
conception of law - has been internalized by judges themselves. 
When they feel obligated to provide an explicit justification for a deci-
sion, they often rely on the type of policy argument that serves as the 
basis of legislation, rather than the principles and analogies of com-
mon law.42 
V. THE OLD LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Legal scholarship in the premodern era was not identical to the old 
concept of law described above. But because it was a prescriptive 
scholarship addressed to judges, it needed to adopt a mode of argu-
ment which was consistent with judicial reasoning. Thus, one of the 
basic tasks of legal scholars was to discern the general principles em-
bedded in the common law. The best medium for doing so were trea-
tises, those magisterial surveys that marshalled thousands and 
thousands of judicial decisions, set them in neat rows and files, dis-
cerned their general pattern and articulated it as a principle of law. 
These treatises came to be viewed as the apotheosis of legal scholar-
40. See, e.g., 1 J. KENT, supra note 15, at 464. 
41. This is an essentially positivist approach, implying that judicial power derives from posi-
tive enactments of the legislature. See, e.g .• H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-32 
(1961); H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 58-64 (1945); J. RAz, THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW 181-97 (1979). When the legislature enacts a judicially enforced statute 
whose terms are vague, the courts are empowered to fill in the gaps by judicial lawmaking. 
42. See M. EISENBERG,, supra note 13, at 26-37; Chayes, supra note 28; Fiss, supra note 28; 
Lyons, Justification and Judicial Responsibility, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 178 (1984). They may also 
rely on moral principles, see M. EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 14-26, and the legitimacy of their 
policy orientation has been questioned, see Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 
(1975). But as an empirical matter, the tendency of modem courts to speak in policy terms 
seems clear. 
808 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:792 
ship, the aircraft carriers of the scholarly fleet. 43 The surest route to 
preeminence was to write one, and the authors of the leading treatises 
are still well-known by law-trained people - synonymous with the 
subject matter, nearly - while their equally learned contemporaries 
are long-forgotten. 
The relationship between the treatises and judicial decisions are a 
classic example of what Eisenberg refers to as the responsiveness of 
common law.44 While treatises were not authority per se, they became 
acceptable citations as crystallizations of the principles embodied in a 
line of cases. They thus provided judges with a pastor, although not a 
Pope - an indirect expression of the general truth that could be con-
firmed by the individual act of examining the precedents. The treatise 
writers responded by proudly filling their footnotes with "citing trea-
tise" citations, and this became further evidence of their quasi-canoni-
cal status. 
Law review articles could fulfill this same function, sometimes cau-
tiously, as the germ of a future treatise chapter, sometimes with star-
tling originality, as Warren and Brandeis did with the right to 
privacy.45 More often, however, articles related to another feature of 
the common law, namely its incrementalism. As the common law de-
veloped on a case-by-case basis, the law reviews responded, first with 
case notes, soon thereafter with more detailed analyses. These articles 
depended on the case for their conceptual horizon, and they also de-
pended on it for their subsequent significance. As long as the case 
represented a current statement of the law and a guiding precedent for 
other decisions, its attendant article was of significance; as the case 
faded in importance, to be replaced by others, the article faded into the 
dim obscurity of law school libraries. Of course, many articles had 
greater aspirations, establishing a somewhat higher altitude, and thus 
defining a broader conceptual horizon than the cases that inspired 
them. But even these generally remained in contact with the underly-
ing case law, providing a greater, but essentially parallel perspective, 
like a spotter plane above advancing troops. 
The reasoning of legal scholarship was not identical to judicial rea-
soning; it relied more on principles and less on analogy, and it was not 
as painstaking in its process arguments. But because it was prescrip-
43. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of 
Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 632, 670-71 (1981). 
44. M. EISENBERG,, supra note 13, at 12-13. 
45. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). On the influence 
of this famous article, see Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 
55 Nw. U. L. REv. 553 (1960); Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law - Were Wa"en and Brandeis 
Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966). 
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tive scholarship addressed to judges, it was compelled to adopt an ap-
proach congruent with judicial reasoning.46 Analogies were regularly 
invoked, not with the same urgency but as important evidence. To 
demonstrate that a particular conclusion was justified, and another 
mistaken, scholars often traced the proper path of argument by pro-
cess reasoning. They often criticized the reasoning in certain cases 
more harshly than the judges, because scholars were not bound by 
rules of precedent or authority, and did not feel obligated to grant 
prior decisions the same deference that judges did. But their analysis 
largely mirrored the judicial approach. Their invocation of principles 
was more direct, but different only in degree. 
Legal scholars used judicial reasoning not simply as a technique, 
however, but as a system of meaning. Because the scholarship defined 
its role as offering prescriptions to judges, the system of judicial rea-
soning seemed like the law itself. Statutory and administrative law-
making were defined out of the discipline, banished to the nether 
world of policy.47 Judicial reasoning - the incremental, analogical, 
process argumentation indirectly guided by general principles - was 
assumed to be the only methodology of law. That was what legal 
scholars meant by the well-worn slogan, thinking like a lawyer, that 
they used as a basis for bedeviling their first-year classes. 
Legal scholarship has changed, of course, since the classic era of 
treatise writing and common law analysis. Treatises have waned in 
their importance, to the point that they are more often regarded as 
guides for students and practitioners than as major scholarly achieve-
ments. 48 Law review articles and books, even those that represent the 
standard mode of scholarship, now invoke policy arguments and social 
science insights more often than they present close arguments from 
lines of doctrine. But most of this work continues to be directed 
largely to judges, and its modes of argument have changed only to the 
degree that the judges' arguments themselves have changed. Policy, 
for example, is considered a way of informing the judicial decision-
making process, a means of redirecting the incremental, analogical 
flow of doctrine. It is recognized, but placed within a judicial frame-
work, just as judges themselves do as a matter of institutional neces-
sity. Explicit policy analysis, unconnected with the judicial 
46. This phenomenon can be termed a "unity of discourse" between judges and scholars. 
Rubin, supra note 7, at 1859-65. 
47. See W. CHASE, supra note 1, at 46-76; R. STEVENS, supra note l, at 51-64. 
48. There are exceptions of course. The most notable, in recent years, is L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONsrITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988) which set forth a highly developed, controversial 
theory of the Constitution. See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
(3d ed. 1988), whose views have been a factor in the scholarly debate within its field. 
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decisionmaking process, is consigned to other disciplines, such as eco-
nomics or political science. 
The shift in basic lawmaking functions from judges to legislatures 
and administrators might have rendered this judicial orientation un-
tenable for a prescriptive discipline like law. Recommendations about 
law, after all, should be addressed primarily to those responsible for 
lawmaking. But the prescriptive character of legal scholarship does 
not require that the success of a work be measured by its real-world 
impact. Rather, prescription serves as a framework of meaning, estab-
lishing guidelines for cr~ting and evaluating scholarly endeavors. 
The work is judged by its quality as a prescription, not by its actual 
effect. This internal value system, a characteristic legal scholarship 
shares with virtually every other discipline, gives the field its coher-
ence. But it also enables legal scholars to continue addressing a deci-
sionmaker who has been demoted to a subsidiary status, despite the 
explicitly prescriptive nature of their discourse. 
Legal scholarship, to be sure, contains a number of new trends -
most notably critical legal studies and the economic analysis of law. 
These two rather disparate movements share a desire to distance 
themselves from standard legal scholarship, employing other disci-
plines to build new intellectual constructs. Nonetheless, both move-
ments have remained bound to the judicial orientation of standard 
scholarship. This is surprising given their aspirations and their rheto-
ric, but it indicates how alluring the siren-song of the judicial frame-
work seems to be. 
The judicial orientation of critical legal studies is the result of its 
origins. There is a radical tradition in American thought - one that 
is somewhat apologetic about its debt to Marxism, but intellectually 
coherent nonetheless.49 This tradition could have been focused di-
rectly on the legal order, both as a critique of existing arrangements 
for the governance of society and as a blueprint for new laws that 
would achieve more justice and equality. Instead, the critical legal 
studies movement was formed from a mixture of this radical tradition 
and a complex, philosophic argument that legal doctrine is inherently 
incoherent. 50 
49. See, e.g., c. BEARD, AN EcONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSI'ITUTION (1913); 
G. KoLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963); A. ROCHESrER, THE POPULIST MOVE• 
MENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1943). 
50. See, e.g., Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstroction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 
(1985); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Criti· 
cal Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Kelman, Interpretive 
Constroction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981); Klare, Judicial 
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 
62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 
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The incoherence argument presents a number of difficulties. To 
begin with, it never developed a sufficient conception of coherence, 
and thus was limited to responsive criticism, rather than formulating a 
comprehensive critique.51 Second, it was attacking something of a 
straw person; legal realism had already criticized the coherence of 
legal doctrine rather effectively,52 and most sophisticated defenders of 
doctrinal coherence probably recognized that doctrine as an uneasy 
practical accommodation by the time critical legal studies took 
shape. 53 This attenuates the linkage between the coherence argument 
and the political motivation of critical legal studies. That linkage is 
necessarily forged by the argument that law's claim to coherence is a 
means of defending the status quo and suppressing people's 
emancipatory instincts. 54 But if law no longer relies heavily on coher-
ence arguments, its social injustice must spring from sources other 
than its claim to intellectual coherence. 
The most serious problem with the incoherence argument, how-
ever, is that it applies almost exclusively to judges. 55 Judges are the 
only public officials whose lawmaking authority is even arguably de-
rived from the conceptual coherence of law. They are, or were, the 
(1985); Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); 
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). 
51. See, e.g., Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?. 100 HARV. L. REv. 332 (1986). 
52. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 25, at 6-22. For leading legal realist criticisms, see, for 
example, J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Bingham, What Is the Law?, 11 
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1912); Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). 
53. The relationship between critical legal studies and legal realism is explored in Peller, 
supra note 50, at 1219-59; Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to Its Origins and 
Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505 (1986). In essence, Peller and Tushnet perceive a simi-
larity in the critical enterprises of the two movements, although they regard the critical legal 
studies attack as the more thoroughgoing. The difference they perceive between these move-
ments is that legal realism had a more optimistic, constructive tone. In fact, critical legal schol-
ars find the proposals of the realist school just as lacking as they find the structure of the 
common law. 
54. See, e.g., M. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 
(1977); R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 5-14 (1986); Dalton, supra note 
50. The theoretical basis of this claim is provided by critical theory. See J. liABERMAS, 
KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (J. Shapiro trans. 1971); M. HoRKHEIMER & T. 
ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (J. Cumming trans. 1972). 
55. The same is often true of two recent movements roughly allied with critical legal studies, 
namely radical feminism and critical race theory. See, e.g., Austin, Sapphire Bound/, 1989 WIS. 
L. REv. 539 (plea for listening to minority women's voices, followed by analysis of the reasoning 
in a judicial decision); Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasona-
bleness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990) (proposing pluralist, nonsexist 
concept of discrimination, then analyzing a judicial decision); Matsuda, Laoking to the Bottom: 
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) (recommending 
a new legal consciousness, then exemplifying it with a judicially structured argument for repara-
tions); West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988) (proposing a feminist con-
ception of law, and applying it to rape and abortion cases). 
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ones who claimed that they were simply extrapolating the transcen-
dental principles that inhere in the body of decided cases. Legislators 
and administrators, our primary lawmakers, see themselves as imple-
menting public policy that is derived from other sources. The coher-
ence of the enactments they produce is of minor importance, either 
morally or practically. At most, it is a heuristic, a way to make en-
acted law easier to understand and implement. 56 
The critical legal studies attack on coherence, therefore, decon-
structs very little as far as modern legislative and administrative enact-
ments are concerned. As a result, the linkage between the attack and 
the political motivation of the movement dissolves in this arena. 
While some critical legal studies writers have focused on other legal 
decisionmakers, 57 the movement has generally leveled its attack on an 
outmoded justification by a subsidiary legal institution, and thus failed 
to articulate a radical critique of our basic legal structure. The reason 
for this diversion of attention is that critical legal studies, like tradi-
tional scholarship, remains bewitched by the judiciary. For tradition-
alists, judges seem like the only officials worth speaking to; for the 
crits, these same judges seem like the only officials worth criticizing. 
The whole movement smacks of an almost adolescent rebellion against 
the most familiar and convenient authority figure, rather than a com-
prehensive attack on social injustice. 
Law and economics explicitly adopts an interdisciplinary frame-
work, a framework which has been directed toward policy analysis 
since its very inception. One would have thought that this would have 
naturally and effortlessly led to the analysis of legislative and adminis-
trative actions, and to the exploration of whether these actions were 
economically efficient. Instead, the legal scholars who inaugurated the 
field focused their attention, once again, on the judiciary. Guido Cala-
bresi used economics to analyze common law liability rules. 58 This 
56. See Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. 
REv. 575 (1984). Trubek perceives an empiricist theme to critical legal studies, a study of "rela-
tions among legal ideas, social beliefs, action, and order," id. at 603, that is directed to generating 
a new legal consciousness. He observes, however, that the movement has been notably averse to 
empirical research. Id. at 615-18. He connects this to the overemphasis on ideology, the un-
proved assumption of CLS scholars that deconstructing ideology will lead to social change. Id. 
at 610-15. But a further explanation is that CLS has mounted an attack on legal rules within the 
arena of judicial doctrine. Trubek's own description indicates this; he identifies the empiricism of 
CLS in its willingness to look at doctrine from the outside, as an observer of its social role. Id. at 
586-600. But what is being looked at is "doctrine" - judge-made or judge-interpreted rules. 
57. See, e.g., Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980) (legislators, 
among others); Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 469 (1984) (law-
yers); see also c. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989). 
58. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 10 YALE L.J. 499 
(1961); Calabresi, Does the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs?, 33 LAW & 
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was followed, more fatefully, by Richard Posner, who quickly moved 
from a promising analysis of regulation to the fantastic claim that 
common law was economically efficient. 59 With that, the entire ap-
proach became bound, almost inextricably, to the analysis of judicial 
decisionmaking. 
It is widely maintained now that Posner was wrong, that he misde-
scribed the common law and failed to understand its meaning. 60 More 
significantly, however, this argument, right or wrong, simply over-
looked the real value of economics. Economics is an analytic tool, 
deriving its philosophic origin from utilitarianism, which allows us to 
determine whether particular strategies are economically efficient. 
Adam Smith used the method to critique the regulatory system of the 
guilds, 61 and Alfred Kahn used it to critique the regulatory system of 
the New Deal.62 The question legal scholars could have asked is 
whether particular sets of laws were efficient, and if not, what laws 
should be enacted in their place. Perhaps they would have concluded 
that the enforcement of private agreements was the most efficient in a 
wide variety of contexts. Perhaps they would also have concluded that 
courts were the most efficient mechanisms for enforcing these agree-
ments. But the starting point of this analysis would have been our 
predominant set of laws, namely, the laws enacted by the legislatures 
and administrative agencies. Instead, law and economics proceeded 
backwards. It began with the common law doctrines and tried to jus-
tify those doctrines in economic terms. It thus confined itself to judi-
cial decisionmaking, a limitation which it has only recently and 
intermittently escaped. 63 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 429 (1968); see Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972). 
59. R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 25-191 (2d ed. 1977); R. POSNER, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF JUSTICE 254-67, 282-99 (1981); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 
(1972); Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudica-
tion, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980). 
60. See, e.g., K. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 248-65 (1988); Cooter & Kornhauser, Can 
Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 154-56 (1980); 
Cooter, Kornhauser & Lane, Liability Rules, Limited Information, and the Role of Precedent, 10 
BELL J. EcoN. 366 (1979); Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed: Claims of Efficiency in the 
Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 591, 610-39 (1980); Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses 
of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 307 (1979). 
61. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). 
62. A. KAHN, THE EcONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (rev. ed. 
1988). 
63. Again, there are a number of works that use law and economics to analyze other topics, 
see, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 
(1974); Scott, Rethinking The Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 730 
(1989). What is striking, given the discipline from which it draws its inspiration, is law and 
economics' continued emphasis on judicial decisions. 
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Other themes, of course, arise in law and economics, critical legal 
studies, and even traditional scholarship. All these fields are complex 
and they include hundreds, thousands, and, in the case of traditional 
scholarship, tens of thousands of separate works. The point is not to 
caricature the literature, but to identify its major theme or project -
the intellectual inquiry that serves as an organizing principle, and to 
which scholars in the field devote their attention. This central theme 
is judicial decisionmaking. Despite all the methodological innovations 
of recent decades, legal scholarship still defines its primary area of 
concern, its concept of what really counts as law, in relation to the 
judiciary. Given the scholarship's prescriptive aspirations, the 
changes in our legal structure demand a new approach. 
VI. THE NEW SCHOLARSHIP 
This brings us to the New Public Law. At present, the effort is 
indeed quite new, but it is also too diffuse to possess established 
boundaries. Many of the best examples of this scholarship were writ-
ten without conscious recognition that they represented a qualitative 
break with the past, and certainly without any sense that they were 
part of a movement. What follows is an effort to define the distinctive 
features of this work and provide a framework for its further 
development. 64 
To create a public law scholarship that is truly new, scholars must 
address themselves to the legislators and administrators who make the 
law, not to the judiciary. Law means something different to these 
decisionmakers, and this is the conceptual change to which legal 
scholars must adjust. The purpose of the reorientation is not only to 
influence legislators and administrators, but to think differently about 
the law itself. For a prescriptive discipline like law, the intended audi-
ence serves as a structuring principle for the discourse; thus, the test of 
a scholarly work is whether it presents a well-reasoned prescription, 
not whether its recommendations are followed. The main reason to 
64. Given the volume oflegal scholarship, developing an exhaustive list of works in a partic-
ular field, even a newly emerging one, would be a daunting task. A few exemplary works of New 
Public Law scholarship which will provide concrete examples of the general category, are as 
follows: B. ACKERMAN & w. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR, OR How THE CLEAN AIR 
ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH SULPHUR COAL PRODUCERS 
AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981); S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 
(1982); Meidinger, The Development of Emissions Trading in U.S. Air Pollution Regulation, in 
MAKING REGULATORY POLICY 153 (K. Hawkins & J. Thomas eds. 1989); Diver, The Optimal 
Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Lehman, Social Irresponsibility, Actua-
rial Assumptions and Wealth Redistribution: Lessons About Public Policy From a Prepaid Tuition 
Program, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1035 (1990); Rabin, EPA Regulation of Chlorofluorocarbons: A View 
of the Policy Formation Process, in MAKING REGULATORY POLICY, supra, at 133; Sunstein, 
Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 407 (1990). 
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shift the audience from judges to legislators is to produce a new set of 
questions and a new mode of analysis that enables one to deal with the 
realities of our modem legal system in a way that is conceptually im-
possible if one thinks of oneself as addressing a judge. By making this 
shift, one changes each of the features of the law from its judicial to its 
legislative and administrative version, and thereby generates a new 
way of thinking about law itself. 
First, legislators and administrators do not see law as an embodi-
ment of general principles, but as an instrumentality for achieving pol-
icy goals. The task of the New Public Law is to identify these 
instrumentalities, to develop a theory for translating policy into law. 
Law, a term which must be taken to include administrative regula-
tions, is the medium in which policy directives are expressed. It is not 
the only medium, to be sure: many less formal devices are employed, 
including memoranda, verbal orders, negotiations, legislative hearings, 
and sub rosa threats. But most major legislative or administrative ini-
tiatives are embodied in a set of formally enacted rules. 
The New Public Law scholarship attempts to answer a new set of 
questions: Which rules work best in general? Which work best for 
particµIar purposes? Under what circumstances is specificity desira-
ble, and under what circumstances is it counterproductive? What is 
the best mechanism for enforcing various provisions? How important 
is public participation for achieving the purpose and how can such 
participation be secured? These inquiries suggest an approach to law 
whose components are not doctrinal arguments, nor translations of 
public policy into doctrine, but legislative and administrative tech-
niques, and the translation of policy into those instrumentalities. 
Perhaps the largest part of this inquiry involves the question of 
enforcement. This is one aspect of a statute or regulation, but it re-
quires a perspective on the whole of modem governance. At the out-
set, one must choose between alternative enforcement mechanisms, 
that is, between courts and agencies. 65 The old scholarship's concern 
with courts has yielded some writing on this topic, but a consistent 
analysis of the relative virtues of the two institutions, as means of im-
plementing public policy, is still needed. The issue must be analyzed 
65. The question is often framed in terms of whether we ought to regulate a particular area 
or leave it unregulated, which of course means it would be regulated by the courts. See, e.g., S. 
BREYER, supra note 64, at 156-83; B. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL EcONOMY OF REGULATION: 
CREATING, DESIGNING AND REMOVING REGULATORY FORMS (1980); A. STONE, REGULA-
TION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES (1982). This elides the choice of substantive standards with the 
choice of enforcement mechanisms, particularly because there are a variety of substantive stan-
dards that can only be enforced by agencies in our system. The somewhat narrower question 
that focuses directly on the enforcement issue is whether we should choose a court or an agency 
to enforce a rule that could, in constitutional and practical terms, be assigned to either one. 
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from the legislature's perspective - an analysis that incorporates Kel-
sen's basic insight that in a regime of positive law, all judicial authority 
results from a grant of jurisdiction by the legislature. 66 
If the courts are chosen as the means of enforcement, the discus-
sion will tend to converge with existing scholarship. Nonetheless, the 
questions will be asked from a different perspective. How should the 
legislature allocate the burden of proof in order to achieve certain 
goals? Should it authorize attorneys' fees or punitive damages? 
Should it create per se violations? These questions are reasonably fa-
miliar, but they are being viewed from the opposite side. The scholar 
would be addressing the legislator, and recommending ways to imple-
ment its goals, rather than addressing the judge, and recommending 
ways to understand the legislature. 
This bears directly on the question of statutory interpretation. In 
prescriptive scholarship, the scholar must generally address one deci-
sionmaker, as a rational or quasi-rational audience, and treat other 
decisionmakers as external forces. The legal literature on statutory 
interpretation, like most other legal literature, speaks to the judge and 
treats the legislature as an outside force whose goals and meaning 
must be guessed at, assumed, or counterfactually constrqcted. 67 The 
new approach addresses the legislature and treats the judiciary as an 
outside force. The question in that case is how to draft a statute that 
will be interpreted by the courts in the manner one desires. 6s This is 
66. See H. KELSEN, supra note 41, at 274-78; see also J. R.Az, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL 
SYSTEM (2d ed. 1980). Whether there is a higher law is not directly relevant, in part because we 
have codified our higher law in a positive albeit general form, but mainly because that higher law 
would not preclude the legislature from deciding whether to preserve or displace common law. 
In other words, Kelsen accurately describes the structure of a modem state, even if he fails to 
provide a satisfactory theory of law. 
67. For example, Cass Sunstein's recent discussion begins with the modem approach to 
interpretation: 
The meaning of a statute inevitably depends on the precepts with which interpreters ap-
proach its text. Statutes do not have pre-interpretive meanings, and the process of interpre-
tation requires courts to draw on background principles. These principles are usually not 
"in" any authoritative enactment but instead are drawn from the particular context and, 
more generally, from the legal culture. Disagreements about meaning often tum not on 
statutory terms "themselves," but instead on the appropriate interpretive principles. 
Sunstein, supra note 29, at 411-12 (footnote omitted). This approach was originally developed 
with respect to literary or religious texts whose origins lie in the remote and, at some level, 
incomprehensible past. See R. PALMER, HERMENEUTICS 33-40, 75-83 (1969). That is not a 
defect of Sunstein's analysis; it is an inevitable attribute of any work that addresses the inter-
preter, whether judge, reader, or stage director, rather than the creator. 
68. From this perspective, Sunstein's insight in the previous note might be restated as 
follows: 
The effect of a statute inevitably depends on the precepts with which subsequent interpreters 
approach its text. Statutes do not have inevitable effects, because the process of interpreta-
tion permits courts to draw on background principles. These principles cannot be pre-
scribed by the legislature but instead will unavoidably be drawn from the particular context 
of the interpreter, and more generally, from the legal culture of a future time. The interpret-
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not an easy question, because of the inherent uncertaillty of language, 
the political differences between courts and legislatures, the need for 
flexibility as circumstances change, and a variety of other factors. But 
a responsible legislator must address this question, and it merits a de-
veloped theory. 
If the legislature chooses an administrative agency as the means of 
enforcement - a situation that is increasingly the norm - the issues 
multiply in their complexity and their unfamiliarity. Unlike courts, 
which are generally just given instructions by the legislature, agencies 
are frequently created or restructured by a regulatory statute. Even if 
the existing administrative structure is retained, the legislature has 
many more options when it assigns enforcement to an agency, the 
most notable being reliance on the agency's rulemaking power. The 
legislature can choose to rely heavily on this power by drafting a stat-
ute that consists of a few hortatory declarations, or it can choose to 
preclude this power, either directly or by drafting rules of crushing 
specificity, or it can choose any intermediate position. Legal scholar-
ship contains a number of articles discussing whether courts should 
hold the first type of enactment void, 69 but it offers little guidance 
about which type is the best means of implementing social policy. 
This is a major task for the New Public Law.7o 
Another set of questions involves administrative strategies. When 
agencies issue regulations, they are also creating law as a means of 
implementing social policies. Many of the questions that apply to leg-
islation apply to these regulations as well. But agencies combine en-
forcement activities with rulemaking, so another range of questions 
arises. For example, should the agency strive for full compliance, 
should it single out the worst offenders, or should it select examples at 
ers will disagree about the meaning of the statutory terms themselves because of differences 
in their interpretive principles. 
The term "effect" has been substituted for "meaning" in the first and second sentences because 
texts almost always have meaning for their creators; the problem is that the creators cannot 
control the reader's construction of meanings, although the construction is based upon the text, 
and determines the effect of the text's creation. 
69. See, e.g., Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administration 
State, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 452, 476-88 (1989); Merrill, Standards-A Safeguard for the Exercise 
of Delegated Power. 47 NEB. L. REv. 469 (1968); Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could 
the Court Give It Substance? 83 MICH. L. REv. 1223 (1985); Schwartz, Of Administrators and 
Philosopher-Kings: The Republic, the Laws. and Delegations of Po»-:er. 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 443 
(1977). 
70. For some rare examples, see Diver, supra note 64; Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 63. 
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random?71 Should it mediate, educate, or punish?72 Should it rely on 
an hierarchical or decentralized structure? These decisions may not 
seem like law, but they can be prescribed by administrative rules, or 
even by legislation. Presently, they count as law only from the con-
ceptual perspective of legislators and administrators. They do not em-
body general, transcultural principles, but simply implement a policy 
goal. If scholars are to address these decisionmakers, they need to 
conceptualize law in these terms. 
A second feature of the New Public Law scholarship is a compre-
hensive or global approach, derived from the frequency of a similar 
approach in the legislative and administrative realm. Because legisla-
tors and administrators are not limited to case-by-case adjudication, 
they can adopt as broad a perspective as they choose, dealing with an 
entire area, or with a series of related (or even unrelated) areas. Legal 
scholars can begin by discussing how broad such perspectives should 
be. But more importantly, they must adopt a similar perspective and 
speak to the concerns of legislators or administrators. From the 
higher altitudes at which these decisionmakers sometimes operate, 
scholars can survey an entire subject area, not on a case-by-case basis, 
but in terms of general, long range plans. They can anticipate issues, 
telling decisionmakers which are likely to arise, instead of responding 
to those that have arisen and have been addressed by a decided case. 
They can attempt to develop comprehensive plans, rather than dis-
cerning general patterns from preexisting legal events. In short, they 
can adopt the legislature's basic temporal orientation toward the fu-
ture, in place of the judiciary's orientation toward the past. 
Underlying this is a basic institutional difference between the two 
groups of decisionmakers. Judges do not initiate the cases they decide; 
where they have some flexibility, they are generally in the position of 
responding to the issues brought to them by adversary parties. Legis-
lators and administrators are subject to no such constraint. While 
they sometimes act in response to the importuning of interest groups, 
71. The pathbreaking work in identifying these issues, within the context of legal scholarship, 
was K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969). Davis's view is that the legislature should 
constrain discretion in the enforcement process, in the interest of justice and political accounta· 
bility. His moral outrage at an inevitable situation, however, obscures most of the interesting 
questions. The inquiry has been continued by political scientists. See, e.g., E. BARDACH & R. 
KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK, THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982); 
M. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET 21-36 (1988); Scholz, Discretion and Enforcement Effi· 
ciency: Problems of Complexity, Contingency, and Corruption, in ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION 
AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 145 (D. Shumavon & H. Hibbeln eds. 1986). 
72. The use of mediation as a tool has received some attention. See Koch & Martin, FTC 
Ru/emaking Through Negotiation, 61 N.C. L. REV. 275 (1983); Comment, Negotiated Rulemak-
ing: An Analysis of the Administrative Issues and Concerns Associated with Congressional At· 
tempts to Codify a Negotiated Rulemaking Statute, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 227 (1990). 
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they must necessarily choose among a vast array of such importun-
ings. They cannot possibly respond to every claim that is cognizable 
in their terms, as the judiciary does. Moreover, legislators and admin-
istra~ors often show considerable initiative, the President's legislative 
program being the obvious example. The New Public Law scholar-
ship must display similar initiative, because of its need to frame pre-
scriptions and because of the conceptual model of its audience. It 
must anticipate issues, and propose statutory or administrative solu-
tions, rather than responding to events and recommending alternative 
judicial reasoning. 
The thinking process, the mode of reasoning, of the New Public 
Law scholarship is different as well. In framing recommendations, 
scholars are not searching for solutions which are intellectually coher-
ent with a pattern of previous decisions, but for solutions that effec-
tively achieved specific goals. This reorientation is generated by the 
shift from analogical to instrumental thinking that characterizes mod-
em legislative and administrative decisionmakers. When addressing 
these decisionmakers, scholars should not treat prior enactments as 
authority, but rather as a source of data. The crucial question is to 
determine what worked in the past, why it worked, and whether it can 
be improved; or alternatively, what failed in the past, why it failed, 
and whether it can be avoided. 
Legislators and administrators, after all, are decisionmakers who 
are explicitly authorized to change the law. In fact, the ideal way for 
them to fulfill their responsibilities may be to review regularly the en-
actments of their predecessors, and determine which ones should be 
altered or abolished. Sunsetting provisions certainly have this goal in 
mind. 73 Whether or not they are an effective device, and how 
methodical and comprehensive the review should be, are themselves 
important questions for legal scholars. At a less general level, these 
questions indicate a general attitude toward substantive law. The 
scholar's task, in large measure, is to carry out this review of existing 
legislation. Government decisionmakers must respond to crises, their 
operational responsibilities, the complex dynamics of their institu-
tional setting and the blizzard of political demands in which they live; 
they therefore are rarely able to review existing legislation in a precise 
and thoughtful manner. But scholars can do so, and they can then 
73. For discussions in legal literature, see G. CALABRESI, supra note 29, at 59-65; Adams, 
Sunset: A Proposal for Accountable Government, 28 ADMIN. L. REv. 511 (1976); Note, Zero-
Base Sunset Review, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 505 (1977). A much more extensive discussion 
appears in Sunset Act of 1977, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of 
the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
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bring significant problems or possibilities to the decisionmakers' atten-
tion. This review is necessarily structured by a search for effective 
social policy, not for an intellectually coherent legal structure. 
A somewhat deeper way the New Public Law scholarship involves 
a different mode of argument is the shift from process justification to 
cause-and-result justification. Process justification has been central to 
legal scholarship for so long that it seems like the essence of the disci-
pline, the sinews of any legal argument. In fact, it soon appears rather 
quaint when one is addressing a legislator or administrator. These 
decisionmakers respond to perceived problems in the operation of ex-
isting law, not to the lack of coherence in these laws, or their failure to 
reflect a general principle. They judge their efforts by the effects pro-
duced. To speak to them, legal scholars need to employ the same 
mode of analysis. This not only means discussing causes and results, 
but arguing in terms of these phenomena. 
All of the foregoing attributes of the New Public Law scholarship 
are derived from the structure of that scholarship, that is, its choice of 
audience and topic. A further question is whether this scholarship re-
quires or implies any particular methodology. While this question 
must in some sense be answered by time, the approach is general 
enough to include a number of existing methodologies, such as critical 
legal studies and law and economics. In fact, one might argue that 
these methodologies are intrinsically more congenial to the New Pub-
lic Law, and have been applied to judicial decisions at the expense of 
their true analytic capabilities. Hence, the new legal scholarship is at 
least as capacious as the old one, and probably more so. The only 
methodology that would be excluded would be the one that was pecu-
liar to traditional scholarship, that is, the doctrinal analysis of legal 
cases. In its place would be a new vocabulary of government planning 
and strategy on which the varied insights of existing intellectual move-
ments could be brought to bear. 
VII. THE NEW PUBLIC LAW SCHOLARSHIP: AN EXAMPLE 
In 1989, Congress enacted and the President approved the Finan-
cial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, or FIR-
REA. 74 The purpose of this legislation is to resolve the savings-and-
loan crisis, a social debacle consisting of the failure of 500 banking 
institutions, the insolvency of a federal insurance fund (the FSLIC), 
and a remaining exposure that is variously estimated at $100 to $500 
74. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 15 
U.S.C.). 
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billion. 75 FIRREA is a complex statute, which is not easily summa-
rized. In essence, it reorganizes the entire regulatory structure of the 
savings-and-loan, or thrift, industry, establishes an independently 
funded agency to administer failed institutions (the Resolution Trust 
Corporation), places primary regulation of surviving savings and loans 
in an office within the Treasury Department (the Office of Thrift Su-
pervision), confers extensive new enforcement powers on these agen-
cies, including cease and desist orders, civil penalties, and criminal 
penalties, and imposes a range of substantive regulations on the surviv-
ing savings-and-loan institutions. 
Prior to the enactment of FIRREA, virtually nothing about the 
statute had appeared in legal literature, although the issue had been 
brewing for at least a decade. 76 Since then, a few pieces have been 
published in practitioner-oriented journals, like the Business Lawyer, 
but little else has appeared. 77 This apparent lack of interest clearly 
does not stem from FIRREA's unimportance. The Act represents a 
major reorganization of the financial services industry, involves sums 
of Department of Defense proportions, and may well determine 
whether we reach the end of this millennium without a fiscal Arma-
geddon. In the most pragmatic terms, FIRREA will occupy a great 
deal of the time of a great many lawyers. A significant proportion of 
the attorneys in major and midsize firms will have some contact with 
it, and a sizable number will be devoting their lives to it for the next 
five or ten years. In all likelihood, the graduates of leading law schools 
will spend more time on FIRREA in the near future than they will 
spend on the entirety of tort law. 
The lack of legal literature about this statute and its attendant is-
75. See generally H.R. REP. No. 54, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 86; E. KANE, THE s & L INSURANCE MESS: How DID IT HAPPEN? 1-
22 (1989). 
76. The thrift problem has been extensively discussed in the business and economic litera-
tures. See, e.g., F. BALDERSfON, THRIFTS IN CRISIS (1985); R. BRUMBAUGH, THRIFTS UNDER 
SIEGE (1988); A. CARRON, THE PLIGHT OF THRIFT INSTITUTIONS (1981); N. EICHLER, THE 
THRIFT DEBACLE (1989); E. KANE, supra note 75; E. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS IN FED-
ERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE (1985); P. PILZER, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: THE INSIDE STORY 
OF THE S & L MESS (1989). 
77. Clark, Murtagh & Corcoran, Regulation of Savings Associations Under the Financial In-
stitutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW. 1013 (1990); Gail & 
Norton, A Decade's Journey from "Deregulation" to "Supervisory Reregulation": The Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW. 1103 (1990); Gail, 
Highlights of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIR-
REA): What Foreign Banks Should Know, 24 INTL. LAW. 225 (1990). One piece appears in a 
university-sponsored journal: Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself: Revising and Re-
shaping the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1117 (1989). 
Professor Malloy teaches at Fordham, Professor Norton at Southern Methodist University; the 
other authors are practicing attorneys. 
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sues can more reasonably be explained by legal scholars' belief that it 
lacks intellectual interest. FIRREA does not embody any general 
principles of law, nor does it contain any well-structured legal argu-
ments. It is a law, in common parlance, but it does not involve any of 
the characteristics that most legal scholars recognize as law. This will 
change, of course, once the statute is construed by the courts; while 
statutory interpretation does not partake of common law's transcen-
dental imagery, it at least displays the mode of reasoning that is famil-
iar, significant, and interesting to legal scholars. And should any 
portion of the statute - even a small, insignificant portion - be de-
clared unconstitutional, an ecstatic outpouring of scholarly attention is 
certain to occur. 
From the perspective of the New Public Law scholarship, how-
ever, FIRREA is a fascinating and immensely significant study, as sig-
nificant to legal scholarship as it is to the nation in general. The 
statute can be seen as an instrumentality for implementing public pol-
icy, in particular, the policy of resolving the savings-and-loan crisis 
and avoiding economic catastrophe. This raises a number of major 
questions. For example, is an independent and independently funded 
agency like the Reconstruction Trust Company the best way to admin-
ister failed savings and loans? This points to a theory about the kind 
of governmental organizations that most effectively carry out specific 
types of tasks. More generally, should administration of this statute 
have been divided up among a series of new agencies, new units, and 
preexisting agencies, as opposed to being unified in one of the three 
(and, if so, which one)? Another major question is whether the pano-
ply of enforcement mechanisms in the statutes will provide effective 
supervision of the industry. The previous regime has been criticized as 
overly timid, 78 but the source of this timidity is uncertain, so we do 
not kllow whether FIRREA simply presses a few more weapons into 
the trembling hands of an inveterate poltroon. Alternatively, perhaps 
the previous regime was too aggressive and scared away good manag-
ers and good money with its intemperance. FIRREA also suggests a 
variety of more substantive questions: for example, are capital ade-
quacy standards the best way to avoid risk, or should we rely on some 
market mechanism by reducing deposit insurance? All these questions 
emerge from shifting the perspective to view law as a means of imple-
menting public policy. 
The New Public Law would also shift the temporal horizon of the 
scholarship. For the past ten years, at the very least, everyone in-
78. See, e.g., E. KANE, supra note 75, at 63-120. 
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volved in the financial services industry has anticipated a crisis of 
some sort. 79 If legal scholars had abandoned the incremental ap-
proach that characterizes judicial reasoning, they might have focused 
on the problem as it developed, and proposed legislative or administra-
tive solutions at that time. These proposals would then have been 
available to both public decisionmakers and the scholarly community 
when FIRREA was being debated, just as scholars' proposals about 
judicial decisionmaking are available to judges when the next related 
case is being decided. Instead, legal scholars said virtually nothing 
about FIRREA when all the major decisions were being made, and 
their contributions will necessarily be limited to secondary adjust-
ments and interpretations of the statute now that it has been enacted. 
The change involved is conceptual, as well as temporal. FIRREA, 
like most modem lawmaking, is social planning; it looks toward the 
future, and attempts to structure and control a part of our society in a 
coordinated way. Congress is not declaring a right and establishing a 
passive enforcement mechanism that will adjudicate people's claim to 
that right. It is empowering an administrative agency - actually a 
group of agencies - and instructing them to implement a plan. For 
legal scholars to participate in this process of modem lawmaking, 
either by advancing new proposals or by criticizing existing ones, they 
must think in terms of social planning. Any number of important 
legal articles could have been written about the way to design a sav-
ings-and-loan statute, and the way to capture specific plans in legal 
language, but the whole issue lies beyond the conceptual horizon of 
most existing legal scholarship. 
In discussing and analyzing these plans, scholars could make use 
of prior law, not as analogy or precedent, but as a source of data. 
Congress has been regulating parts of the financial services industry 
for over a century, so and regulating the thrift industry in a comprehen-
sive fashion for nearly half a century.81 As a result of these efforts, a 
vast amount of information is available about the effectiveness of vari-
ous statutory provisions, from their general concept to their specific 
language. To make use of this information, prior statutes must be re-
79. The financial issues were all fully canvassed by Carron in 1981, see A. CARRON, supra 
note 76; indeed, they were already quite familiar to policymakers at that time. See S. Rep. No 
378, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 238-40 (committee 
report accompanying the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 
1980, P.L. 96-221, 94 Stat. 732). 
80. The oldest of the existing regulatory statutes is the National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 
99 (1864) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1-216). 
81. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449); National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
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garded as a source of data, not as a source of authority. Congress has 
plenary authority to replace these statutes; indeed, given the serious-
ness of the crisis, it probably has a responsibility to do so. But it has 
an equal responsibility to learn from past experience; we should not 
make the same mistakes in 1989 that we made in 1980, 1965, or 1933. 
Had legal scholars found the savings-and-loan crisis to present im-
portant issues; had they addressed it in planning terms, and had they 
used prior law as a source of data, they would have been in a position 
to advance the kinds of recommendations to which prescriptive schol-
arship aspires. To justify these recommendations, in a way that would 
make sense to the decisionmakers who are being addressed, at least in 
theory, these proposals would need to be justified in terms of their 
results. 
The arguments that legal scholars would advance to justify their 
recommendations are reasonably apparent. If they recommend a par-
ticular regulatory structure, they must argue for it in terms of its abil-
ity to manage failed savings and loans, while avoiding further failures. 
An argument for a comprehensive agency or for the subordination of 
all the different agencies to the Treasury Department or the President 
would need to be justified in these terms; a traditional approach, argu-
ing that these solutions could be derived from our theory of govern-
ment, would seem chimerical to public policymakers. The same is 
true for the recommendation of various enforcement mechanisms. 
While familiar question about constitutional and moral constraints un-
doubtedly limit what a government agency can do, those constraints 
only establish outer boundaries. The choices made within those 
boundaries must be justified by their real world effects. 
VIII. CAN LEGAL SCHOLARS Do IT? 
The major objection raised in law schools to the claim that legal 
scholarship must change is not conceptual, but pragmatic. One com-
ponent of this objection involves the training and background of legal 
scholars: "Other academics are trained to do X,· we would just be 
amateurs, dabbling in areas that possess a sophisticated theory of their 
own, and that demand specialized, rigorous training."82 Legal schol-
ars also assert they lack the institutional resources needed for this new 
approach to law, such as grants, graduate students, and access to data 
processing faculties. 83 Finally, if legal scholars develop a new ap-
82. See, e.g., Friedman, The Future of Law and Social Sciences Research, 52 N.C. L. REV. 
1068 (1974); Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 323 (1989). 
83. See, e.g., Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REv. 763, 774-79 
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proach directed to legislators and administrators, its intended audi-
ence may not pay attention and the entire effort will be fruitless. 
The first two of these concerns reflect a misunderstanding of the 
New Public Law. As existing examples of New Public Law scholar-
ship suggest, the idea is not to transform legal scholarship into public 
policy or social science, but to develop a new approach based on a new 
conception of law. Although the relationship between law and other 
disciplines would change, the structure oflegal academics - the train-
ing and institutional organization - would remain. 84 In other words, 
the New Public Law is not an abandonment of the field, but a reinter-
pretation of it to enable it to fulfill its self-declared purposes. 
This can be seen most clearly by examining the relationship of the 
New Public Law scholarship to other fields, most notably public pol-
icy and social science. This scholarship, which focuses on planning 
and treats law as an instrumentality for achieving defined purposes, 
certainly overlaps substantially with public policy research. 85 But 
even if one insists on maintaining the distinction between law and pol-
icy, a vast field remains for legal scholars to occupy. Once the policy 
analysis is complete, a means must be found to implement the choice 
that the analysis has generated. In the regulatory area, legislatures act 
largely by passing laws, and administrators often act by passing regu-
lations. This means more than simply stating the policy in legal lan-
guage. It involves what might be called the fine structure of the 
statute or regulation, the myriad of decisions that must be made below 
the level of the basic policy choice. Many of the questions discussed 
above would be included in this category - the choice of enforcement 
(1986); Schuck, supra note 82; Trubek, A Strategy for Legal Studies: Getting Bok to Work, 33 J. 
LEGAL Eouc. 586, 587-89 (1983); Trubek, The Place of Law and Social Science in the Structure 
of Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL Eouc. 483, 484 (1985) [hereinafter Trubek, The Place of Law 
and Social Science]. ' 
84. Undoubtedly, the number of applicants with advanced degrees in other fields, and the 
attractiveness of such applicants to law school admissions committees, will increase. This is an 
incremental change, however, and affects the tone of the law school, rather than altering its 
structure. 
85. In fact, there is probably no intellectually meaningful argument for distinguishing be-
tween these fields in the first place. The first law schools to appear on university campuses were 
pure trade schools staffed by practicing lawyers, and functioned as a substitute for apprentice-
ship. See R. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 7-10. The theoretical study oflaw and the incorporation 
of public policy perspectives was far removed from these institutions. When law schools devel-
oped as true university departments, with a faculty consisting of full-time academics, there were 
several attempts to integrate professional training for private practice with policy analysis. See 
id. at 39-42; W. CHASE, supra note 1, at 46-59. These efforts seemed to have foundered on a 
variety of institutional realities, but also on a formalist conception of law that excluded public 
policy. That conception was persuasive at the time but no one believes it any more. See B. 
ACKERMAN, supra note 25, at 6-22. 
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mechanisms, the design of new mechanisms, the nature of the instruc-
tions given to those entities, and so forth. 
These problems are preeminently legal questions; to the extent that 
legal scholars do not address them, virtually no one will. To be sure, a 
public policy and political science literature on implementation is de-
veloping, 86 but it tends to focus on the administrative level only. More 
significantly, it represents only one small area within the general scope 
of these disciplines, whereas it is one of the central questions for the 
legal field. In general, one might distinguish the elements of a statute 
or regulation on the basis of its discourse. The policy choice emerges 
from internal discussions among members of the decisionmaking 
body; this can reasonably be regarded as the realm of public policy 
research, if one chooses to preserve that distinction. But once that 
choice is made, it must be implemented by instructions issued to an 
enforcement mechanism, whether court or agency. This is legal schol-
arship's domain, a fact which no one doubts when the enforcement 
mechanism is a court, as it necessarily was in most premodem stat-
utes. The emphasis on judicial decisionmaking obscured the statute's 
character as a legislative instruction. In the modem administrative 
state, the instruction is generally issued to an agency,87 but it remains 
a declaration of the law and a subject that legal scholars should 
address. 
The skills we associate with legal training are the ones needed for 
this purpose. These include a close attention to language, an under-
standing of the relationship between linguistically stated rules and in-
stitutional behaviors, an ability to translate fact situations and other 
data into a legal framework, an understanding of the relationship be-
tween normative or political choices and systems of rules, and an abil-
ity to apply general principles to specific situations. Of course, all 
these skills must be adapted to a new environment. New skills must be 
acquired, such' as a deeper understanding of power relationships and 
nonjudicial institutions, while some existing skills, such as reasoning 
from precedent, are no longer needed. But the general range of tech-
niques that would be needed are recognizable as "legal" ones. 88 
86. See supra note 35. 
87. See F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 124-44 (1973); 
T. Low1, THE END OF LIBERALISM 105-07 (2d ed. 1979); Diver, supra note 64, at 76-77; Rubin, 
Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 375·80 (1989). 
88. These skills, it should be noted, are not those associated with "skills training," but those 
involved in the study and practice of law as a totality. Skills training involves what Haberrnas 
refers to as strategic action, that is, action designed to affect people's behavior (to get them to do 
what the actor wants), 1 J. HABERMAS, supra note 38 at 273·337. For a general description of 
skills training, see Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 162 (1974); see also Gaubatz, Moot Court in the Modern Law School 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
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In fact, the New Public Law could aspire to the heroic stance that 
legal academics adopted in the formalist era. As the field develops, 
scholars should be able to articulate general theories covering large 
segments of their subject area. One can imagine a theory about when 
private causes of action are effective, what kinds of agencies can imple-
ment specific programs, how statutory language can be used to control 
adjudicatory behavior, or which enforcement strategies an agency 
should use in particular circumstances. We might even see a revival of 
the treatise, with its comprehensive treatment of recognizable divisions 
within the general area of study. Part of the reason treatises flourished 
was that legal scholars were occupying and organizing new territory 
- new in the sense that it had not been previously discussed within 
the framework of their formalist theory. The New- Public Law might 
serve as the impetus for similarly comprehensive efforts. 
The same can be said about the relationship of legal scholarship to 
social science. Clearly, many of the tasks involved in New Public Law 
scholarship call for insights and techniques from social science disci-
plines. The structure of enforcement mechanisms, for example, must 
be informed by political science analysis of these institutions. Other 
aspects of this scholarship would depend even more heavily on social 
science. To use prior law as a source of data, one must rely on studies 
of the law's effects; while such studies sometimes appear in legal litera-
ture, they are more commonly performed by political scientists, econo-
mists, and sociologists, using techniques that are characteristic of 
those fields. Similarly, the cause-and-result justification of recommen-
dations would depend upon these fields. Because the prediction of re-
sults requires extrapolation from existing data, using models, 
controlled experiments, attitude surveys, and the like, the methodolog-
ical component of this effort is likely to be fairly complex. 
While all this social science can appear to be a daunting prospect 
to academics whose training consisted of reading appellate decisions, 
law professors, in theory, are able to perform social science studies. 
Some have, 89 and most probably could with a combination of self-
training, collaborative efforts, and the collegial assistance generally 
available on a university campus.90 But the essential task of legal 
87 (1981). Legal skills are those involved in any legal activity including policymaking (instru-
mental action in Habermas' terminology) and the general effort to understand a legal system 
(hermeneutic action). 
89. For a few examples, see D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT 
OF CHILD SUPPORT (1979); G. HAWKINS & F. ZIMRING: DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT 
IN CRIME CONTROL (1973); M. LAWRENCE, J. SNORTUM & F. ZIMRING, SOCIAL CONTROL OF 
THE DRINKING DRIVER (1988). 
90. In addition, empirical research need not consist of technical studies and statistical analy-
sis. Simply getting out of the Jaw school and talking to the folks about whom one is generalizing 
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scholars is not to generate data; rather, it is to make use of data in 
framing recommendations.91 Public decisionmakers, many of whom 
have only legal training, and many of whom have even less, do this all 
the time in designing laws and regulations. It could thus be consid-
ered an inherently legal task, at least in the context of the modem 
state. Certainly, it is not duplicative of other disciplines. While social 
scientists are often willing to advance prescriptions based upon their 
research, they do not often engage in a sustained application of re-
search results to the problem of drafting statutes or regulations.92 If 
legal scholars do not pursue this inquiry, it will not be done, which is 
often the case at present. Such an assignment of responsibility makes 
sense, for if generating research data is the work of social scientists, 
determining the meaning of that data for our problems of governance 
is the work of the legal community.93 
The legal scholar, moreover, need not passively receive other peo-
ple's studies. Legislatures and administrative agencies commission re-
search, and legal scholars could .generate needed research as well by 
suggesting useful lines of inquiry to social scientists. This requires 
planning - the scholar must identify a problem, sketch a long-term 
solution, and decide what research is needed to indicate the advisabil-
ity of that solution. Judicially oriented scholarship is unlikely to 
frame questions that seem meaningful to social scientists, but New 
Public Law scholarship would be a different matter. There are also 
possibilities for collaborative work between social scientists and legal 
scholars; this would make more sense to both scholars if the temporal 
structure of their approach were roughly congruent. In the end, legal 
scholars need to learn to work with social scientists and make use of 
can be a valuable source of information and can serve as the basis of important empirical studies. 
See, e.g., Getman, Contributions of Empirical Data to Legal Research, 35 J. LEGAL Eouc. 489 
(1985); Trubek, The Place of Law and Social Science, supra note 83, at 483·84. 
91. The failure of prior efforts to incorporate empirical research into legal scholarship is 
certainly chastening. See R. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 131-41; Schlegel, American Legal Real-
ism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 
195 (1980). But one problem seems to have been that legal scholars were committed to generat-
ing empirical research, rather than to using it. Of course, gathering data without a clear sense of 
purpose is a quagmire, as Schlegel indicates. But even gathering data with that sense of purpose 
can be a quagmire for legal scholars, given the institutional realities. See Getman, supra note 90. 
The starting point, rather, is to perceive the relevance of empirical research, to use what is avail-
able, and to confess ignorance as to the rest (rather than speculating about it, as legal scholars 
tend to do). Once that point is reached, the legal scholar can consider whether she should under-
take the effort to gather the missing data herself. 
92. Drafting exemplary statutory or regulatory language is simply not part of social science 
methodology, even when the work would lead logically to this result from a legal scholar's point 
of view. 
93. See M. Galanter, Presentation, "The Future of Law and Social Sciences Research," at 
Assessment Conference: Developments in Law & Social Sciences Research, 52 N.C. L. REV. 
969, 1060 (1974) (real problem with empirical study of law is conceptual, not institutional). 
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their results, not to transform themselves into members of a different 
discipline. 
The third pragmatic objection to the New Public Law scholarship 
is that legislators and administrators will not listen to it. We are per-
suaded that judges listen, that they possess the quality of responsive-
ness to scholarship that Eisenberg describes. This is partially because 
the scholars' mode of reasoning is so precisely attuned to their own, 
but also because we view judges as public-oriented decisionmakers. 
Legislators and administrators seem more political and less intellec-
tual; more important perhaps, their staffs consist of people other than 
recent law school graduates. A New Public Law scholarship directing 
recommendations to them might seem - despite all its modernity and 
intellectual significance - to be a voice crying in the wilderness. 
But Just as the first two objections represent a misunderstanding of 
the New Public Law scholarship, this objection represents a misunder-
standing of prescriptive scholarship in general. Of course legislators 
and administrators will not always, or even often, follow the recom-
mendations of legal scholars. In some cases, they have their own 
ideas; in others, their actions may well be determined by political con-
siderations. But as stated above, the test of prescriptive scholarship is 
not whether decisionmakers embrace it as a complete solution to the 
issues they confront. The test, rather, is whether its orientation serves 
as a structuring principle for scholarly evaluations of each others' 
work and thereby provides a framework for the cumulative develop-
ment of a prescriptive discipline. 
Both prescriptive and descriptive scholarship represent efforts to 
achieve understanding; according to our rules of scholarly discourse, 
description is an effort to understand the present condition of the sub-
ject, and prescription is an effort to understand its potentialities.94 Be-
cause prescription is phrased in terms of concrete recommendations, it 
may seem purposeless unless those recommendations are acted upon. 
Yet description is even more remote from action, and we recognize its 
value in terms of our goal of understanding. Prescription contributes 
to understanding as well, particularly when we are studying a dynamic 
94. This appears to run counter to Habermas' distinction between strategic (or instrumental) 
discourse and hermeneutic discourse. See 1 J. HABERMAS, supra note 38, at 284-95. But the 
crucial question is one of intentionality. Statements framed as a prescription can be hermeneutic 
(le., directed toward understanding) if they are intended and structured to achieve an under-
standing of the proper course of action, that is, an autonomous agreement by the other party that 
the recommended course of action is desirable. In fact, given the phenomenological perspective 
that lies at the base of Habermas' approach, the inherent intentionality of all thought would tend 
to efface any normative distinction between prescription and description, provided that both are 
intended to reach an autonomous, mutual agreement, rather than using the recipient of the com-
munication as a means to an end. 
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subject that is shaped by social action. Thus, a scholarly discourse 
that enables us to frame prescriptions for ordinary governmental ac-
tion is not only a means of improving the specific actions discussed, 
but a means of understanding government in general. This general 
understanding may in tum enable us to improve the governmental 
process, in ways that are quite distinct from the adoption of specific 
scholarly prescriptions. 
Real-world influence is satisfying, however, and most legal schol-
ars would probably be loath to abandon it as a potential reward or 
validation of their work. But they do not need to do so; the idea that 
legislators or administrators are deaf to scholarly arguments, while 
judges attend to them, misconceives the way in which scholarly ideas 
exercise practical effects. To expect that the scholar will frame a rec· 
ommendation and some government official, whether judge or legisla-
tor, will then implement it in the precise form in which it was 
advanced is a chimera spawned by a conception of authority, not influ-
ence. That sort of immediate and complete response is what superiors 
expect from their subordinates, or better still, what parents expect 
from their children: "When I say that the market is the best mecha-
nism for setting utility rates, I expect you to deregulate at once, and I 
don't want you fooling around with political considerations or alterna-
tive policies!" Even superiors and parents often find their expectations 
frustrated; anyone who defines scholarly influence in terms of an 
equivalent level of obedience will be more frustrated still and will 
probably conclude that no such influence exists. In fact, the mecha-
nism of influence is more varied and less determinate. In some cases 
recommendations create general moods, from which decisionmakers 
distill approaches to specific problems. Or these recommendations in-
sinuate themselves into the decisionmaker's world view, to reappear in 
forms that neither the decisionmaker nor the scholar could predict. 
They may act as catalysts, clarifying and mobilizing thoughts that the 
decisionmakers have long possessed, but never acted on. Or they may 
shape decisions that have already been made, providing direction and 
detail. 
Because of the complexity and subtlety of this process, scholarly 
influence can readily coexist with political motivation. To be influ-
enced by scholars, legislators need not be Platonic guardians. If they 
give some thought to the public interest, if they sometimes base their 
actions on their sense of what is best for the nation rather than for 
themselves, they will be open to the variety of channels through which 
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scholars can address them.95 Moreover, scholarly influence may not 
even require this dilute form of explicit public interest. The way deci-
sionmakers construct their conceptions of political advantage may it-
self provide a channel for prescriptive discourse. Decisionmakers may 
believe that they can maximize their chance for reelection or reap-
pointment by simply following the express commands of special inter-
est groups, but they may also believe that they will obtain political 
advantage by achieving the results those groups desire. Once political 
advantage is constructed in this way, policy-based scholarship will 
seem relevant, however indirectly. Going further, once a body of pre-
scriptive scholarship exists, it may influence the legislators' estimation 
of political advantage. 
IX. Is IT LAw? 
One further aspect of the New Public Law scholarship that pro-
duces a lurking sense of unease is whether or not such scholarship 
really involves "law." The depth of legal scholars' commitment to a 
judicial orientation suggests that there is something definitional about 
that orientation, something that goes beyond a conscious choice of 
topic to one's self-image as an academic. The reason biologists ignore 
nature poetry in their scholarly work is not because they regard poetry 
as invalid; if asked, they would answer that poetry is simply not "biol-
ogy." The scholarly aversion to addressing legislators and administra-
tors may spring from similar sources. It is not easy to respond to this 
concern, because it relies on a somewhat elusive conception of law. 
For present purposes, an answer can be provided by distinguishing 
three possible meanings of the term: that law is a system for control-
ling people, specifically officials who wield state power; that law is a 
conceptual system with an inherent logic; and that law is a moral sys-
tem, embodying widely held or transcendental values. This article will 
conclude by briefly considering whether the New Public Law qualifies 
as "law" according to each of these three meanings. 
One of the great benefits of law is the rule of law, and a principal 
virtue of a rule of law is the control it exercises over government offi-
cials. When we speak of our society as one of laws, we are not think-
ing of its ability to manage the economy or to preserve public order, 
95. Public choice theory asserts that legislators and administrators never adopt this perspec-
tive, see, e.g., M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE w ASHINGTON EsrABLISHMENT 
(1977); D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); Peltzman, Toward a 
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 211 (1976). But most observers take the 
view that these officials respond to a variety of motivations. See, e.g., R. FENNO, CoNGRESSMEN 
IN CoMMITTEES (1973); J. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984); 
A. MAASs, CONGRESS AND THE CoMMON GOOD (1983); W. MUIR, LEGISLATURE (1982). 
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but of the controls that are imposed on power-holding individuals.96 
This is an instrumental concept of law; the argument is that law serves 
as the best means for achieving equity or justice. 
This view of law explains legal scholars' concern with the judiciary 
for two different reasons. First, the judiciary is assigned the task of 
imposing law on other branches of government. If an agency over-
steps its jurisdiction, if an administrator cancels peoples' benefits be-
cause he thinks they are ugly, if a legislature curries electoral favor by 
infringing on constitutional rights, the courts are supposed to inter-
cede and say: "We forbid you to do this because it violates the law." 
Second, the judiciary, in this supervisory role, and in the other roles 
such as adjudicating between private parties, is itself constrained by 
law. Judges (have no popular mandate and no supervisors besides 
other judges; their actions are constrained only by the law itself and it 
is only through fealty to law that they avoid the charge of uncon-
trolled discretion. These two legal roles are related, of course; judges 
are the chosen agent to impose the law on others because they them-
selves are bound by it in an immediate and unalloyed manner. 
Legislators and administrators, one might argue, are of less con-
cern to legal scholars because they are supervised by judges, and be-
cause their own actions, while they remain within judicially 
established boundaries of lawfulness, are controlled by popular man-
dates, not by law. This was a persuasive argument in 1840, but, as a 
practical matter, it ignores the reality of the administrative state. The 
vast bureaucratic apparatus of our modem state has obliterated Mon-
tesquieu's neat categories of governmental functions. Judicial supervi-
sion remains important, but it is no longer adequate to ensure that 
powerful government officials obey the law. These officials are too nu-
merous, their tasks are too technical and their ongoing responsibilities 
too comprehensive to be controlled by a few hundred law-trained 
judges. Under FIRREA, for example, small armies of administrators, 
in at least four major administrative agencies, will wield extensive 
power over savings-and-loan institutions, including the power to 
restructure or eradicate these institutions within relatively brief peri-
ods of time. The federal judiciary will not be able to ensure the lawful-
ness of this enterprise in any realistic sense. In addition, the multiple 
layers of the bureaucratic system are too thick to be controlled by 
elected officials. FIRREA mandates that the ongoing administration 
of savings-and-loan institutions be moved from an independent agency 
to the Treasury Department. This is congruent with formalist views 
96. See F. HAYEK, supra note 87, at 3-5, 24-31; T. Low1, supra note 87, at 92-129. 
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that independent agencies are unconstitutional, but the practical dif-
ference it makes in terms of popular control is questionable; the only 
elected official with direct authority over the numerous operations-
level administrators under the new organization will be the President 
of the United States. 
The use of law as a means of controlling government officials thus 
becomes an argument for a New Public Law, not against it. If we 
want the rule of law, we must secure it through recommendations to 
legislators and administrators. We must ensure equity and justice by 
the way we design statutes and the way we structure our administra-
tive system, not through eighteenth-century bromides about judges 
and elections. Law is to be found in the administrative mechanisms 
that control the discretion of operations-level personnel, in the resolu-
tion of turf battles between administrative agencies, in the heavy, 
three-ring binders that contain the operations manuals for a veritable 
infinity of governmental functions, and in the day-to-day practices of 
several million federal and state employees sitting at metal desks be-
hind shoulder-high acoustic partitions. Unless scholars have a legal 
theory that articulates controls at this mundane level, they cannot 
contribute fully to establishing the rule of law. 
As a conceptual system, the appeal of judicial lawmaking is its in-
tellectual coherence. Common law fits together in a fashion which 
permits deductive arguments at a preempirical level. Other areas, in-
cluding constitutional law, at least aspire to this same coherence and 
thus encourage and respond to similarly theoretical arguments. As-
sessing this perceived coherence is a complex task, but one cannot 
deny its appeal. 
Tiie response here is fairly obvious however. Legal scholarship 
cannot choose its topics on the basis of their aesthetic qualities unless 
it is willing to be condemned to a subsidiary role. There are undoubt-
edly regularities in the legislative and administrative realm, but they 
are approximate, empirically grounded ones, not the celestial music of 
the formalist's dreams. That may make the field less entrancing, but it 
does not make it any less important. Our society is too pragmatic, and 
the demands of modern governance are too insistent, for us to aban-
don intellectual inquiry into a field because of the unappetizing quality 
of the results. 
Going further, our society's dominant intellectual system is heavily 
empirical in its designation of value. We have an independent, empiri-
cally based set of criteria for assigning significance to particular inquir-
ies or fields, and we then seek whatever regularities or truths (as we 
define them) we can discover about each field, on the basis of our oper-
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ative methodologies. We do not begin with a methodological defini-
tion of value, which then confers significance on those fields to which 
it can be applied. Thus, it is intellectually indefensible for legal schol-
ars to begin with an a priori definition of truth, and then restrict their 
inquiries to fields where those truths can be observed. Undoubtedly, 
our judgments of significance are theory-laden, but the theory is self-
consciously different from our systems of evaluation. We can say, 
quite definitively, that the administrative system is important because 
of its impact on society. It is then incumbent upon scholars to develop 
the best theories, both descriptive and prescriptive, for that system, 
even if those theories seem less satisfactory than those in other fields. 
Finally, there is the moral component of law. Common law and 
other judicially developed areas seem to express a normative perspec-
tive which statutes and administrative regulations lack.97 To the ex-
tent that legal scholarship constitutes an exploration of those norms, a 
New Public Law would lie beyond its boundaries.98 Of course, we 
would want to impose our norms on the administrative state, but that 
process could only be implemented by morally cognizant actors, in 
other words, the judiciary. This sensibility is probably one reason why 
legal scholars tend to regard the administrative system through judi-
cial eyes. 
One difficulty here involves the status of the norms that purport-
edly inform judicial decisionmaking. If these norms are regarded as 
deontological, one would need some moral theory that would generate 
97. The most forceful modem exponent of this view is Ronald Dworkin. As a consequence, 
he develops a normatively based theory of law derived almost exclusively from judicial decision-
making. See Dworkin, supra note 42. In R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986), he does discuss 
legislation, but he seems to view it as a secondary illustration of his judicially based model. 
98. In discussing the law-and-society movement, Lawrence Friedman argues that one can 
readily adopt a "scientific" or social science approach to an inherently "nonscientific" topic, that 
is, the legal scholar can study normative systems, just as sociologists of religion study religious 
beliefs. Friedman, supra note 83, at 764-66. Epistemologically, the point is certainly true, if only 
because there is probably no area, including astronomy, particle physics, or animal behavior that 
is inherently "scientific." The term refers to our attitude toward the subject matter, not some 
inherent trait that the subject possesses. But at the more specific level, Friedman raises a major 
problem about the disjunction of methodology and subject matter. If one is studying a normative 
system, it is possible, of course, to employ social science methods, as Friedman suggests. But the 
use of these methods distances the scholar from her subject matter. If one regards the subjects as 
equals, one will tend to join their normative debates, rather than just studying them from afar. 
This tendency is validated by current thinking about social science methodology. See, e.g., H. 
GADAMER, supra note 17, at 235-74; c. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973); 
1 A. SCHUTZ, COLLECTED PAPERS 48-66 (1962); C. TAYLOR, THE EXPLANATION OF BEHAV· 
IOR (1964); P. WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE 72-109 (1958); Winch, Understanding a 
Primitive Society, 1 AM. PHIL. Q. 307 (1964). The social science approach, although theoreti· 
cally applicable to normative behavior, is much more comfortable when applied to instrumental 
behavior, that is, when the subjects themselves recognize the methodological relevance of social 
science to their own activities because they are trying to achieve a goal, rather than express a 
norm. 
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them But the norms implicit in the common law, or other judicially 
established fields, are too specific to be intrinsic elements of any moral 
theory our society would regard as persuasive. 99 In general, we tend 
to justify common law norms by instrumental arguments, 100 which 
raises the possibility that these norms, however homologous in struc-
ture with true deontological propositions, are no better at achieving 
our true, deontological norms such as equality and justice than are a 
variety of purely instrumental mechanisms. To redeem the deontolog-
ical status of common law norms, one would need to invoke a second-
level norm, to the effect that instrumentalities achieve a preferred sta-
tus when they are stated in normative discourse. But this too must be 
related to a general moral theory, or it is nothing more than a bald 
assertion that common law is superior to statutory law. It is doubtful 
that we have such a moral theory. 
Indeed, the reverse may be the case. Habermas' argument, 101 
echoed by critical legal studies scholarship, 102 is that the claim to de-
ontological moral status, like the claim to objective truth, is a form of 
oppression unless that claim is an aspirational one which explicitly 
opens itself to hermeneutic evaluation. To be sure, common law has a 
hermeneutic structure because it abjures unmediated access to its guid-
ing principles in favor of contextualized expression. But that structure 
does not apply to any second-order claim to the superiority of norma-
tive discourse. Indeed, the discourse of social theory and public policy 
enables us to evaluate the ability of normatively stated propositions to 
achieve our underlying values. The common law's claim to independ-
ent moral status is little more than an assertion of unjustified 
authority. 
In fact, the whole notion that judicial decisionmaking necessarily 
produces justice, or is more likely to produce justice than some other 
99. See Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Common-Law 
Justification, 63 CoRNELL L. R.E.v. 707 (1978). Summers provides a list of deontological norms 
or "rightness reasons" in common law; it includes conscionability, punitive desert, justified reli-
ance, restitution for unjust enrichment, comparative blame, due care, and relational duty. Id. at 
718-19. These are highly specific legal standards; while Summers may be correct in claiming 
them as a basis for judicial decisions, it would be hard to view them as a justification for the 
common law itself. 
100. For example, one might justify the norm of"conscionability" by arguing that it achieves 
equality, or autonomy; it would be hard to claim that we have a moral position that supports 
conscionability per se. This makes conscionability an instrumentality for achieving some deeper 
norm, even if Summers is correct in doubting that it can be reduced to a purely instrumental 
social policy. See Summers, supra note 99, at 778-82. In fact, many observers feel that there is a 
fairly strong tendency to justify all judicial decisionmaking in policy terms. See Farber & 
Frickey, supra note 24, at 876-77; Strauss, supra note 24, at 917. 
101. See J. HABERMAS, supra note 54, at 87-90; J. HABERMAS, Technical Progress and the 
Social Life World, in TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY 50 (1971). 
102. M. HOROWITZ, supra note 54; R. UNGER, supra note 54, at 5-14. 
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mechanism, is a myth. This is not to say that it is false. It is a myth in 
the sense that it encapsulated a world-view, and provided a system of 
meaning through which we could live and, in this case, govern our-
selves. Whether this system was desirable or undesirable remains an 
open question; the point is simply that the judicial approach is not law, 
but a particular concept of law that was engendered by a particular 
worldview. It no longer represents a comprehensive worldview, but 
continues to thrive as a more particularized claim. Some scholars may 
find this claim to be an adequate justification for focusing their efforts 
on judicial decisionmaking. For most scholars, however, that focus is 
a product of habit and conceptual orientation, not a well-developed 
normative position. 
The modem, administrative state has its own myth, its own nor-
mative system of meaning. This myth is that the welfare of our soci-
ety, and the essential, deontological norms in which we believe, are 
achievable by governmental action. It further claims that the perform-
ance of our government can be improved, that there are techniques of 
governance that can be discovered, adopted, aild applied. The New 
Public Law enables legal scholarship to participate in this enterprise, 
and indeed, to play an essential role that is not available to any other 
academic discipline. One can, of course, reject the New Public Law by 
rejecting this myth. But as the administrative state continues and ex-
pands, this rejection will increasingly condemn legal scholars to fatal-
istic irrelevance or dyspeptic reaction. 
